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Abstract
Big data and analytics have changed politics, with serious implications for the protection of personal
privacy and for democracy. Political parties now hold large amounts of personal information about the
individuals from whom they seek political contributions and, at election time, votes. This voter data is
used for a variety of purposes, including voter contact and turnout, fundraising, honing of political
messaging, and microtargeted communications designed specifically to appeal to small subsets of
voters. Yet both privacy laws and election laws in Canada have failed to keep up with these developments
in political campaigning and are in need of reform to protect voter privacy. We provide an overview of big
data campaign practices, analyze the gaps in Canadian federal privacy and election law that enable such
practices, and offer recommendations to amend federal laws to address the threats to voter privacy
posed by big data campaigns.
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Big data and analytics have changed politics, with serious implications for the protection of
personal privacy and for democracy. Political parties now hold large amounts of personal
information about the individuals from whom they seek political contributions and, at
election time, votes. This voter data is used for a variety of purposes, including voter contact
and turnout, fundraising, honing of political messaging, and microtargeted communications
designed specifically to appeal to small subsets of voters. Yet both privacy laws and election
laws in Canada have failed to keep up with these developments in political campaigning and
are in need of reform to protect voter privacy. We provide an overview of big data campaign
practices, analyze the gaps in Canadian federal privacy and election law that enable such
practices, and offer recommendations to amend federal laws to address the threats to voter
privacy posed by big data campaigns.
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THIS ARTICLE ADDRESSES THE CHALLENGES for voter privacy posed by

Canadian political parties’ use of big data analytics.1 Big data, consisting of mass
data collection and algorithmic analysis, is an integral part of Canadian politics,
as parties collect, store, and analyze voter data in an effort to run more effective
campaigns. As Ira Rubinstein defines the term, big data “refers to novel ways
in which organizations, including government and businesses, combine diverse
digital datasets and then use statistics and other data mining techniques to extract
from them both hidden information and surprising correlations.”2 With big data
techniques, large datasets are analysed for patterns, data is matched to categorise
people into discrete segments by shared characteristics, and people are profiled
1.

2.

Throughout the article, we use “voter” as a shorthand to refer to the individuals whose
personal information is collected and used by political parties. We do recognise that some
of these individuals may not have voted or registered to vote, but they are subjects of data
collection by the parties and are at least potential voters. This category is broader than eligible
voters, whom Elections Canada refers to as “electors.”
The term “big data” has been attributed to a 2011 McKinsey report. James Manyika et al,
“Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity” (1 May 2011),
online: McKinsey Global Institute <www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/
our-insights/big-data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation>. See generally, Ira S Rubinstein, “Big
Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning” (2013) 3 Intl Data Privacy L 74 at 76.
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according to inferences based on data correlations. Applied to the election context,
big data refers to the collection of large quantities of personal information about
voters, the development of political party databases, and the use of a diverse set of
technologies common in the private sector to analyze this information, including
sophisticated algorithms, machine learning, and predictive analytics. Canada is
no anomaly in this respect, as the use of big data in electoral campaigns is now
widespread globally. In short, “[e]lections are becoming increasingly ‘datified.’”3
The rise of big data has immense implications for individual privacy, given
the vast amounts of personal data collected and the lack of transparency about
its use.4 The uses and potential abuses of big data in politics received global
attention, with reverberations in Canada, in light of allegations that Facebook
data about voters was misused in the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and
in the United States’ 2016 presidential election. In these incidents, data about
Facebook users travelled downstream to a campaign consultant specializing in
psychographic profiling, without users’ knowledge, and ended up in the hands
of Cambridge Analytica, which specialises in big data analytics. The high-profile
media coverage of Cambridge Analytica heightened public awareness of the

3.

4.

UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Democracy Disrupted? Personal Information and
Political Influence (ICO, 2018) at 10 [ICO, Democracy Disrupted]; Jamie Bartlett, Josh
Smith & Rose Acton, The Future of Political Campaigning (Demos, 2018) at 26. See also
Robert Yablon, “Campaigns, Inc.” (2018) 103 Minn L Rev 151; Jeff Chester & Kathryn C
Montgomer, “The Role of Digital Marketing in Political Campaigns” (2017) 6 Internet Pol’y
Rev 1; Zeynep Tufekci, “Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational
Politics” (2014) 19 First Monday, online: < firstmonday.org/article/view/4901/4097>.
On big data and privacy see generally, Anita L Allen, “Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big
Data Economy” (2016) 130 Harv L Rev 71; Julia Lane et al, eds, Privacy, Big Data, and the
Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Omer Tene &
Jules Polonetsky, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics” (2013)
11 Nw Tech & Intell Prop 239; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, “Big Data and Due Process:
Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms” (2014) 55 Boston College L Rev
93; Solon Barocas, “Big Data’s End Run Around Procedural Privacy Protections” (2014) 57
Comm ACM 31; Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Broadway Books, 2017).
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privacy and political implications of vast troves of personal information being
accessed and interpreted for elections.5
Canadian election and privacy law, however, has failed to keep pace with
this move to digital campaigning, with significant implications for voter privacy.
Unlike private companies’ collection and use of consumer data, which is subject
to regulation under existing privacy legislation, political parties’ collection and
use of voter data is largely exempt from federal privacy legislation. Political
parties are specifically excluded from the federal privacy legislation regulating the
public sector, the Privacy Act,6 and are not included in the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), the federal privacy legislation
regulating the private sector.7 While election law has mechanisms to provide basic
5.

6.
7.

See generally Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Trust but Verify: Rebuilding
Trust in the Digital Economy Through Effective, Independent Oversight, 2018, (Annual Report
to Parliament on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the
Privacy Act) Catalogue No IP51-1E-PDF (2018) online (pdf ): <www.priv.gc.ca/media/4831/
ar_201718_eng.pdf> [OPC, Trust but Verify] (on the electoral data targeting by Cambridge
Analytica based on Facebook data); House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access
to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Towards Privacy by Design: Review of the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, (February 2018) (Chair: Bob Zimmer),
online (pdf ): <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP9690701/
ethirp12/ethirp12-e.pdf> [ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design]; House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Democracy Under Threat: Risks
and Solutions in the Era of Disinformation and Data Monopoly (December 2018) (Chair: Bob
Zimmer), online (pdf ): <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/
RP10242267/ethirp17/ethirp17-e.pdf> [ETHI, Democracy Under Threat]; UK, Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Interim Report (Cm
363, 2017-19) at 26-28 [Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation
and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report]; UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Investigation into
the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns (Report to Parliament) (6 November 2018),
online (pdf ): < ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-useof-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf> at 26-39 [ICO, Investigation
into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns]; Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada & Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia,
Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services Ltd. by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada, (PIPEDA Report of Findings)
Catalogue No 2019-004 (November 2019), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-anddecisions/investiations/investigations-into-businesses/2019/pipeda-2019-004> [OPC and
OIPC BC, Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services]; Office of the Information and
Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data,
and Voter Consent, Investigation Report by Michael McEvoy, 2019 BCIPC 07 [McEvoy,
Full Disclosure].
Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.
SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA].
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information about individual voters to political parties through the National
Register of Elections, it fails in any meaningful way to regulate mass voter data
collection by parties. This gap in legal protection is striking because parties’
growing reliance on voter data and the increasingly sophisticated techniques for
analyzing it have dramatically heightened the potential privacy risks for voters.
This article focuses on the practices of federal political parties8 with respect
to collecting, storing, and using voters’ personal information and argues that
political parties, like commercial entities and government, should be subject
to privacy regulations.9 The use of personal data for political purposes is as
susceptible to misuse as the use of personal data for commercial activities,
but with consequences that reverberate beyond the marketplace and into the
legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Protecting voter privacy is necessary to
safeguard the privacy of voters and to safeguard the integrity of the electoral
process. As the Information Commissioner’s Office in the United Kingdom
warned, “we are at risk of developing a system of voter surveillance by default,”
which “could have a damaging long-term effect on the fabric of our democracy
and political life.”10 Political parties are an essential conduit for the “meaningful
participation” of Canadians in elections and for democracy more generally in
Canada.11 Without adequate protections for voter privacy, however, the evolving
8.

Political parties are heavily regulated entities under the Canada Elections Act. See SC 2000,
c 9 [CEA]. They are defined in section 2 as: “an organization one of whose fundamental
purposes is to participate in public affairs by endorsing one or more of its members as
candidates and supporting their election.” While parties remain private rather than public
organizations, their inner workings and legal obligations are defined in detail by the CEA,
as are those of their “candidates” and “electoral district associations.” “Candidates” are
individuals nominated by the political party to represent them in an electoral district and
an “electoral district association” “means an association of members of a political party in an
electoral district” (ibid, s 2, 71(1)). Other relevant regulated entities under the CEA include
third parties, which are defined by section 349 to be “a person or a group, other than a
candidate, registered party or electoral district association of a registered party.” Third parties
are often labour unions, corporations, and civil society groups, but can also be individuals.
See generally, Michael Pal, “Is the Permanent Campaign the End of the Egalitarian Model
of Elections?” in Richard Albert, Paul Daly & Vanessa MacDonnell, eds, The Canadian
Constitution in Transition (University of Toronto Press, 2019) 338 at 347-49 (for a recent
discussion of the changing role of third parties).
9. We focus in this article on the law related to political parties. We emphasize from the outset,
however, that a comprehensive solution for voter privacy requires addressing other actors and
Canadian privacy law more generally.
10. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 9. See also ICO, Investigation Into the Use of Data
Analytics in Political Campaigns, supra note 5 at 19.
11. Figueroa v Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 37 at para 27 [Figueroa].
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big data practices of parties threaten to undermine the relationship between them
and the voters they seek to influence and, most importantly, to represent.12
In the wake of recent incidents highlighting mass data use by political parties
and the corresponding data vulnerabilities for voters, several changes have been
put forward in Canada, including amendments to federal election law in the
Elections Modernization Act (EMA)13 and a Parliamentary committee report
proposing to make political parties subject to PIPEDA.14 While these are positive
steps, the proposals do not go far enough. PIPEDA is a poor model to adopt for
political parties because it does not impose sufficient privacy obligations on the
private sector that it already regulates. Indeed, with the “protection” of PIPEDA,
Canadians are extensively tracked online and are vulnerable to data breaches and
prolific data collection and analysis.15 The EMA has the objective of addressing
electoral digital threats but does not impose strong substantive limits on what
parties can do with personal information held about voters. Legal reform, therefore,
is still required. Reform should be done in a manner that respects the personal
information of voters and the foundational democratic connection between them
and political parties. To protect Canadians’ personal information in the special
context of elections, we recommend that new legal duties be imposed on political
parties that limit their use of voters’ personal information, while still ensuring
that parties have enough information about voters to formulate public policy and
12. Much has been written on the broader implications for democracy of digital campaigning.
See generally, Philip Howard, New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen (Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Daniel Kreiss, Prototype Politics: Technology-Intensive Campaigning
and the Data of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2016); Cass R Sunstein, #Republic:
Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton University Press, 2017); Colin
J Bennett, “Trends in Voter Surveillance in Western Societies: Privacy Intrusions and
Democratic Implications” (2015) 13 Surveillance & Soc’y 370; Damian Tambini, “Social
Media Power and Election Legitimacy” in Damian Tambini & Martin Moore, eds, Digital
Dominance: The Power of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (Oxford University Press,
2018) 265 at 289 (noting that “while social media still in theory offer new opportunities for
democracy, the increasingly commercial and increasingly smart, data-driven social media may
in the long term be on a collision course with the open, voluntary, equal public deliberation
required by democracy”) [Tambini, “Social Media Power and Election Legitimacy”]. For the
Canadian context, see Kaija Belfry Munroe & HD Munroe, “Constituency Campaigning in
the Age of Data” (2018) 51 Can J Pol Sci 135.
13. SC 2018, c 31 [EMA].
14. ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5.
15. There is a vast literature on digital privacy. See e.g. H Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev & Heng Xu,
“Information Privacy Research: An Interdisciplinary Review” (2011) 35 MIS Q 989; Daniel
Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (NYU Press, 2004);
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational
Principles, by Ann Cavoukian (Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 2009).
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to communicate with voters who consent to their personal information being
used by political parties. Ensuring that political parties are subject to meaningful
privacy rules is of paramount importance given the widespread and rising use of
intrusive big data techniques in Canadian politics.
This article illustrates how Canadian federal legislation facilitates big data
practices in politics, has failed to keep up with evolutions in political practice,
and is in need of reform. Following this introduction, Part I explains the current
framework under elections law for political parties to obtain data about voters,
and details how Canadian political parties augment this information by recourse
to big data. Part II explains the gaps in existing federal privacy and elections
legislation (PIPEDA,16 the Privacy Act,17 and the Canada Elections Act (CEA),18
including the 2018 amendments of the EMA19) and other relevant legislation, and
examines the negative consequences for voter privacy of the legislative gaps. Part
III advances a legal framework for enhancing voter privacy while still facilitating
necessary communication between political parties and voters.

I. THE DATA PRACTICES OF CANADIAN PARTIES
Digital campaigns comprise a series of steps from identifying, learning about,
and categorizing voters, to honing messages and communicating with them.20
In federal politics in Canada, the process of voter data procurement begins with
the CEA, which regulates political parties and other political entities. Under
the CEA, parties are entitled to receive basic information about voters, which
becomes the building block for data-led campaigning. Pursuant to section 44(1),
the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) maintains a National Register of Electors (the
“Register”). The Register contains personal information about electors, consisting
of the surname, given name, gender, date of birth, and civic and mailing addresses
of each elector.21 The definition for “personal information” in section 2(1) of the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

PIPEDA, supra note 7.
Privacy Act, supra note 6.
CEA, supra note 8.
EMA, supra note 13.
See Tambini, “Social Media Power and Election Legitimacy,” supra note 12, at 274
(on the generic stages of a social media political campaign). He identifies the stages as
building the audience, audience segmentation, message creation and testing, message
targeting, and delivery.
21. Elections Canada, “Description of the National Register of Electors” (2019),
online: Elections Canada <www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=reg/
des&document=index&lang=e>.
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CEA is the same as the one used in section 3 of the Privacy Act.22 The accuracy
of the information is enhanced via sharing agreements between federal and
provincial bodies.23 The Register serves to produce a list of electors to Elections
Canada in order to administer the election,24 and to Members of Parliament
(MPs) and registered parties and their candidates in order to campaign.25 Not
all of the information is shared with political parties; for example, sex and date
of birth are omitted.26 Electors can choose to opt out of the Register27 and to
request access to the information that Elections Canada holds on them. The
Privacy Commissioner may, at any time, audit how the personal information on
the Register is protected.28
Candidates and MPs may use the list of electors to communicate with
voters, including for the purposes of soliciting contributions and recruiting party
members.29 The 2014 amendments to the CEA in the Fair Elections Act (FEA)30
increased the available voter data by granting political parties easier access to
information about who has cast a ballot. These so-called “bingo cards” record
the identification number for each person who votes and are shared daily during
advance voting and more frequently on election day.31

22. CEA, supra note 8, s 2(1); Privacy Act, supra note 6, s 3.
23. CEA, supra note 8, s 55(2).
24. Ibid, ss 93, 104.1, 105, 107, 109. “Electors” is the term used by Elections Canada for
eligible voters.
25. Ibid, s 45.
26. Elections Canada, “Guidelines on Use of the Lists of Electors” (September
2020), online: <www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&dir=ann/
loe_guide&document=index&lang=e>.
27. Elections Canada, “Description of the National Register of Electors,” supra note 21.
28. Privacy Act, supra note 6; see generally, Elections Canada, supra note 21.
29. CEA, supra note 8, ss 110, 111.
30. SC 2014, c 12 [FEA].
31. Ibid, s 52. This rule is now in section 291 of the CEA. See CEA, supra note 8, s 291. See
also Laura Payton, “Privacy Concerns Raised by Marc Mayrand Over Election Changes,”
Canadian Broadcasting Company (6 March 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
privacy-concerns-raised-by-marc-mayrand-over-election-changes-1.2563048>; Election Act,
RSBC, 1985, c A-1 [BC EA]. Similarly, in British Columbia, the provincial Election Act was
amended to inform political parties who voted in the last provincial election. The Office of
the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia called the amendment
regrettable, partially due to the fact that the office lacked jurisdiction to enforce privacy
protections against political parties. See Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
for British Columbia, News Release, “Statement from B.C. Information and Privacy
Commissioner regarding proposed amendments to Bill 20 (Election Amendment Act)” (14
May 2015), online (pdf ): <www.oipc.bc.ca/news-releases/1792>. The British Columbia
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To create more comprehensive voter profiles, political parties supplement
basic voter data under the statutory entitlement with additional information
from a variety of sources. Traditional means of acquiring voter data include
telephone calls, door-to-door canvassing, surveys, polls, and records of political
contributions.32 Newer technologies for the collection of voter information,
including mobile applications, social media, commercial data, and location
tracking on mobile devices such as smartphones, have augmented these traditional
mechanisms. The collated voter information is stored in voter management
systems, commonly referred to as voter or political party databases.
While membership lists have long been kept by political parties, voter
databases are a relatively new phenomenon.33 The first Canadian political party
to use a sophisticated database was the Conservative Party of Canada, whose
Constituent Information Management System (CIMS) was built in 2004.34
The Liberal Party of Canada built their own voter database management system
called the “Liberalist.”35 The New Democratic Party currently uses a system called
“Populus,”36 replacing their old “NDP Vote” system.37 The Green Party uses
“Nation Builder,” a commercially available application for voter management
and community mobilization.38 Apps for mobile devices enable canvassers to
transfer information collected in the field to the central database.39 Data for
national and local campaigns are now generally linked. Data may also flow

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

Election Act does have some protections for voter privacy that are not present in the federal or
other provincial statutes. See BC EA, supra note 31, s 275.
See Colin J Bennett & Robin M Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal
Privacy Protection: A Comparative Analysis (Linden Consulting, 2012) online (pdf ): Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <www.priv.gc.ca/media/1756/pp_201203_e.pdf> at 16
[Bennet & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy].
See Colin J Bennett, “The Politics of Privacy and the Privacy of Politics: Parties, Elections and
Voter Surveillance in Western Democracies” (2013) 18 First Monday, online: <firstmonday.
org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4789/3730>.
Conservative Party of Canada database, “Constituent Information Management System,”
online: <www.apps.conservative.ca/login?rdr=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.conservative.ca>.
Liberal Party of Canada database, “Liberalist,” online: <www.liberalist.liberal.ca>.
New Democratic Party of Canada database, “Populus,” online: <populus.ndp.ca/
foreAction1/login/auth>.
See Susan Delacourt, Shopping for Votes: How Politicians Choose Us and We Choose Them,
2nd ed (Douglas and McIntyre, 2013) at 307; Colin Bennett, “They’re Spying on You: How
Party Databases Put Your Privacy at Risk” (1 September 2015), online: iPolitics, <ipolitics.
ca/2015/09/01/theyre-spying-on-you-how- party-databases-put-your-privacy-at-risk>.
Nationbuilder, “Home,” online: <www.nationbuilder.com>; McEvoy, Full Disclosure,
supra note 5 at 27.
See e.g. Liberalist, “What is Liberalist,” online: <www.liberalist.liberal.ca/what-is>.
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between affiliated federal and provincial parties or between the national and
provincial wings of a federal party. In some instances, provincial and federal
databases are amalgamated, and in other instances provincial parties prefer to act
independently of their federal counterparts’ data strategies.40 Provincial parties
sometimes voluntarily subscribe to federal party databases.41
With the traditional techniques to collect information about voters, such
as canvassing households, voters generally had the autonomy to choose whether
to share information with parties and could vary the level of detail and the type
of information shared. Over the course of the last several elections in Canada,
however, voter data collection and analysis techniques have evolved rapidly
such that data collection is less transparent and more intrusive.42 In the absence
of strong regulatory oversight from any level of government, it was difficult
to know precisely the type and amount of personal information that each
party collects, since parties typically viewed their data practices as providing
a potential competitive advantage and were reticent about the sources and
types of information collected.43 However, investigations that were conducted
globally by privacy commissioners in search of answers, after such high-profile
voter data incidents as Cambridge Analytica, have revealed many details about
parties’ heretofore guarded practices surrounding data-driven campaigns.44
Major technology-driven changes include parties’ development of their own
mobile apps, reliance on advertising through social media, use of databrokers
as information intermediaries, reliance on predictive analyses, the application
of big data analysis to discern information about segments of populations as
well as individual voters, and the deployment of campaign strategies that borrow

40. Belfry Munroe & Munroe, supra note 12 at 16-18.
41. See Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Liberals to Target Ethnic Voters with Demographic Database
Software” The Globe and Mail (14 April 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/database-helps-liberals-woo-ethnic-vote/article17953049/>.
42. See Rebecca Green, “Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity” (2013) 85 Temp L Rev 367
at 383; Philip N Howard & Daniel Kreiss, “Political Parties and Voter Privacy: Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom and United States in Comparative Perspective,” (2010) 15
First Monday, online: <www.firstmonday.org/article/view/2975/2627>.
43. Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection, supra
note 32 at 16; Howard & Kreiss, supra note 42 at 19.
44. OPC, Trust but Verify, supra note 5; ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5; ETHI,
Democracy Under Threat, supra note 5; ICO, Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in
Political Campaigns, supra note 5; OPC and OIPC BC, Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ
Data Services, supra note 5; McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5.
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techniques from commercial marketing.45 The investigations have illuminated
how modern information technologies can enable even a small databroker’s
activities to wreak “global and cascading privacy implications” that cross
continents and involve the data of tens of millions people.46
With the rise of big data, political parties can harness voter data by greater
orders of magnitude, and subsequently target voters with far greater precision.47
Political parties increasingly rely on data that is not overtly “political,” including
commercial information, to glean insights about voters’ political preferences.48
Data about voters is an amalgamation of consumer data, basic electoral data, public
records, internet browsing, search engine queries, social media postings, mailing
lists, subscriptions and memberships, loyalty cards, credit card information, online
purchases, and geolocation information from mobile devices, which is added to
the voter information that parties have collected based on their interactions with
voters and the data provided from the Voter Contact Registry (the “Registry”).49
With the increased use of wearable devices (such as fitness trackers), home
assistants, home security cameras, smart televisions, gaming consoles, and other
Internet of Things devices, data will become increasingly precise and profuse
about specific individuals, including activities and movements. Traditional
metrics about voters, such as neighbourhood, income, educational level, and
ethnicity, are rudimentary in relation to the variety and amount of information
that can be collected about individuals from online and networked sources and
the detailed tools for profiling available with modern algorithmic technologies.
Parties seek to learn ever more detailed information about increasingly discrete
segments of the population and then to microtarget those audiences through
advertising or other communications, honed to appeal specifically to that small
subset’s preferences, rather than the population as a whole. These techniques
of big data are used prolifically and with more sophistication in each election

45. See Claudio Feijóo, José-Luis Gómez-Barroso & Shivom Aggarwal, “Economics of Big
Data” in Johannes M Bauer & Michael Latzer eds, Handbook on the Economics of the
Internet (Edward Elgar, 2016); ICO, Investigation Into the Use of Data Analytics in Political
Campaigns, supra note 5 at 18.
46. OPC & OIPC BC, Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services, supra note 5,
“Conclusion”; see also McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5.
47. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 21.
48. For example, the US Republican Party began using consumer information to target voters in
the 1980s. See Green, supra note 42 at 384.
49. See Elizabeth F Judge & Michael Pal, Privacy and the Electorate: Big Data and the
Personalization of Politics (SSHRC Knowledge Synthesis Grant Report) (October 2016).
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cycle.50 Big data produces a large economic ecosystem in which multiple players
are involved in the curation, analysis, and use of data.51 Political parties work in
advance with analytic companies to develop their respective voter models.52
Social media companies like Google, Twitter, and Facebook have played
an increasingly influential role in the new era of data-driven campaigns,
facilitating targeted advertising and making social media an indispensable part of
modern-day campaigns.53 Social media platforms not only generate information
about individuals based on their online activities, but are also used by parties
and candidates to communicate with individuals.54 Social media supports
microtargeting by enabling parties to choose the audience for a message, and
which version of that message is sent. For example, with Facebook, political
parties can choose “core audiences” (whereby an audience is manually selected for
particular traits such as location, gender, age, or interests); “custom audiences”
(whereby parties upload individuals’ contact details and Facebook matches that
with their data); and “lookalike audiences” (whereby Facebook sends the message
to a dynamically changing set of Facebook users who have similar interests to the

50. Belfry Munroe & Munroe, supra note 12. The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office
notes that the “extent to which political parties use social media, data analytics, and
micro-targeting techniques is—to a large extent—dependent on their size, resources, and
reach into the electorate.” See ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 21.
51. Feijóo, Gómez-Barroso & Aggarwal, supra note 45 at 513-14.
52. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 27.
53. As of February 2018, “Facebook and Google have 60% of US digital ad spend and 20%
of total global spend.” See Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation
and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report, supra note 5 at para 87. See also Daniel Kreiss & Shannon
C McGregor, “Technology Firms Shape Political Communication: The Work of Microsoft,
Facebook, Twitter, and Google with Campaigns During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Cycle”
(2018) 35 Pol Comm 155 (on the major internet platforms’ role as active agents in the
political process of shaping political communications). Tambini cautions against the
consolidation and vertical integration of campaign services in one platform, noting Facebook
is a “one-stop-shop for fundraising, recruitment, profiling, segmentation, message targeting,
and delivery” and is also a foreign company for most of the globe. As Tambini flags, platform
dominance could lead to unintentional or deliberate biases. See Tambini, “Social Media
Power and Election Legitimacy,” supra note 12 at 281-82.
54. See Sofia Grafanaki, “Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data” (2017) 27 Fordham
IP Media & Ent LJ 801 at 859-60; Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Broadway
Books, 2017) at 180-84.
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fixed custom audience).55 Social media platforms also create a larger ecosystem of
data about people. Through access to contact lists on mobile devices and social
media, personal information is collected not only about the user but also about
a user’s friends and family, a practice that has become increasingly controversial
because of the lack of transparency to the user and a lack of consent by the
contacts.56 For instance, in some campaign apps, users are asked to login using
their email, phone number, or Facebook account, where the latter grants the
candidate’s campaign access to personal information available on Facebook as
well as a list of their friends and family (who do not have the opportunity to
consent).57 Further, social media companies exchange data about their users
prolifically with other internet companies.58
55. See Facebook, “Ad Audiences,” online: <www.facebook.com/business/
help/168922287067163>. Facebook has offered “value-based lookalike audiences” since
2017. Likewise, Google Ads supports audience targeting by demographics, custom audiences,
and “similar audiences.” See Google Ads Help, “Targeting Your Ads,” online: <www.support.
google.com/google-ads/answer/1704368?hl=en>. See also ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra
note 3 at 41-42 (noting that for all the online platforms the “full range of advertising services
are available to political parties and campaigns in the same way as they are to all other
organizations”); McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5, at 25; OPC and OIPC BC, Joint
Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services, supra note 5.
56. As an example of non-users’ data entering the data market, the Canadian company
uCampaign’s mobile app asks app users for permission to access their address books and
employs “gamification” strategies to motivate people to engage with political campaigns by
awarding users points for sending texts and emails to contacts. See Digital, Culture, Media
and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report, supra note 5 at paras
121-22. See also Aleksandra Korolova, “Privacy Violations Using Microtargeted Ads: A Case
Study” (2011) 3 J Privacy & Confidentiality 27-49; David Ingram, “Facebook Fuels Broad
Privacy Debate by Tracking Non-Users” Reuters (15 April 2018), online: <www.reuters.
com/article/us-facebook-privacy-tracking/facebook-fuels-broad-privacy-debate-by-trackingnon-users-idUSKBN1HM0DR>; Rob Price, “Facebook Collects Data on Non-Users
for ‘Security’ – Here’s the Whole Story” Business Insider (11 April 2018), online: <www.
businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-collects-data-non-users-for-security-2018-4>.
57. Between 2010 and 2014, Facebook had “Friends Permissions,” which “allowed developers
to access data related to users’ friends, without the knowledge or consent of those friends.”
After 2014, some of these practices continued. GSR, the company owned by the Cambridge
professor whose research was used by Cambridge Analytica, relied on a “pre-existing
application functioning under Facebook’s old terms of service” after Facebook revised their
terms of service to prevent that kind of data scraping. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim Report, supra note 5 at paras 102, 105;
ICO, Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns, supra note 5 at 30-31.
58. See e.g. Gabriel JX Dance, Michael LaForgia & Nicholas Confessore, “As Facebook Raised a
Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants” New York Times (18 December 2018),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html>.
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Typically in campaigns’ voter databases, voters are assigned scores that
measure their political leaning, which is extrapolated from the amalgamated
data.59 This “persuadability score” influences whether an individual is contacted
by a candidate, by what communication method, and how much effort is put into
convincing them to vote or delivering them to the polls. As these scoring schemes
have matured, they encompass ever-more personal information from more
sources. The score is used to allow campaigns to effectively target voters, thereby
producing more efficient campaign tools, such as walk lists, phone lists, email
lists, and lawn sign allocations.60 Persuadability scores can be especially effective
for mobilizing marginal voters who are instrumental in close elections, enabling
parties to target swing voters or the geographical areas where ridings are in play.
Left unchecked, the future of data-driven campaigns will become even
more individualised and data-dependent, and accordingly pose more serious
challenges for voter privacy. A 2018 study for the UK Information Commissioner
identified seven trends for data analytics in political campaigns: detailed audience
segmentation to create more granular categories and more atomization of voters;
cross-device targeting through geolocation data and the Internet of Things to
identify data across multiple devices as belonging to a single person and to
customise messages for a “segment of one”; growth in psychographic techniques
and facial recognition to target messages by emotional state; use of artificial
intelligence to measure and improve campaign messages in real time; use of
artificial intelligence to automatically generate bespoke advertising based on an
individual’s interactions with chatbots; use of mass personal data to improve the
prediction of election results; and new delivery platforms for campaign messages
such as wearables, smart TV, and virtual reality.61 Not all of these practices are
evident yet in Canada. Any new technology that gathers relevant information
about voters, however, will eventually be useful to political parties. The import of
these trends is a coalescence toward customising unique messages for an audience
of one voter. Accordingly, campaigns “will be incentivised to hold or obtain more
personal data on individuals, and to collect as much diverse data as possible,
in order to maximise the effectiveness of their messaging.”62

59. Belfry Munroe & Munroe, supra note 12 at 12. For example, in CIMS each voter in the
database is assigned a score of -15 to +15, while the Liberalist scoring ranks voters on a
scale of 1 to 10.
60. Delacourt, supra note 37 at 246-47, 254-55.
61. Bartlett, Smith & Acton, supra note 3 at 27-37.
62. Bartlett, Smith & Acton, supra note 3 at 38.
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The particular ways in which political campaigners use data analytics have
important implications for the quality and extent of engagement between parties
and Canadians, with a resulting impact on voter privacy and democracy.63 First,
microtargeting enables politicians to home in on the segment of the population
that is likely to vote for them and, by extension, enables parties to identify
voters who are very unlikely to vote for them. Rather than designing messages
for the entire population or a region, the rational calculus for parties with scarce
resources is to mobilise the voters most likely to support them and not to waste
precious time and money attempting to contact or persuade individuals who
are likely to be unreceptive. For instance, the Liberal Party database has “the
capacity to sort neighbourhoods for canvassing, to identify which houses were
worth visiting and which houses were not.”64 A candidate seeking to cover as
much ground as possible during canvassing could use metrics to determine that
it was only worth knocking on the doors of some houses on a street. The Council
of Europe has warned of such “political redlining,” meaning the deliberate lack
of engagement by a party with voters who have been identified by the data
as unlikely to vote or as being part of a constituency that is not necessary to
win an election.65 The Council has cautioned that the redlining effects can be
compounded in subsequent elections as data from past elections influences future
campaign choices.
More sinisterly than the risk that some voters will be ignored by some
parties, microtargeting also raises the spectre of direct voter suppression. If big
data analytics designed to predict the intentions of voters can be used to mobilise
turnout, it can also be used to suppress it. Voter suppression tactics include
any communication designed to dissuade an individual from casting a ballot,
including circulating disinformation regarding voting procedures. The kind of
misleading automated phone calls designed to suppress turnout in the “robocalls”
63. Solon Barocas identified four ways that microtargeting contributes to undermining
democracy: (1) an increased willingness and ability to deliver messages on wedge issues that
would be extremely divisive in a more public forum; (2) voter discrimination and de facto
disenfranchisement; (3) a chilling of political participation due to perceived violations of
voters’ privacy; and (4) a general trend toward single issue politics that leads to increased
partisanship among voters and ambiguous political mandates for elected representatives.
Solon Barocas, “The Price of Precision: Voter Microtargeting and Its Potential Harms to the
Democratic Process” (PLEAD ‘12: Proceedings of the First Edition Workshop on Politics,
Election, and Data, ACM New York, November 2012), (2012) ACM 31.
64. Delacourt, supra note 37 at 287.
65. Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on Media Pluralism and Transparency of Media
Ownership, Feasibility Study on the Use of Internet in Elections, MSI-MED 3rd Meeting
(2017) at 13 [COE, Feasibility Study on the Use of Internet in Elections].
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scandal during the 2011 Canadian federal election could be replicated through
online communications with the same intent.66 The “robocalls” gave misleading
information about where individuals could vote and some involved fraudulent
impersonation of Elections Canada officials. Attempts by foreign actors at voter
suppression in the 2016 United States presidential election involved interference
through social media platforms and relied on data analytics to carry them out.67
Second, the manner in which parties use big data analytics encourages the
treatment of voters as consumers. The precision of modern microtargeting by
political parties depends on combining information traditionally considered
to have political relevance with insights drawn from other information, such
as consumer purchases. Modern campaign practices of Canadian political
parties conflate the individual as consumer and the individual as citizen, thereby
producing campaign strategies that closely emulate marketing strategies designed
for consumers.68
Third, microtargeting may provide incentives for negative messaging and
wedge issues, which could result in more divisive campaigns.69 The United
Kingdom’s report on disinformation characterised it as “relentless targeting of
hyper-partisan views, which play to the fears and the prejudices of people, in order
to alter their voting plans.”70 As a research consultancy cautioned, “there is a
danger that political messaging will become more emotional in tone, appealing
more often to anger, frustration or prejudice, in an attempt to mobilise voters
and maximise engagement with content,” which is “likely to have other, longer
term effects on the health of democracy.”71 Microtargeting could exacerbate
the effects of echo chambers (content from like-minded individuals) and filter

66. See Michael Pal, “Canadian Election Administration on Trial: ‘Robocalls,’ Opitz, and
Disputed Elections in the Courts” (2017) 28 King’s LJ 324.
67. See US, Robert S Mueller, Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016
Presidential Election, vol 1 (Department of Justice, March 2019). See especially ibid at 24-26.
68. Delacourt, supra note 37.
69. COE, Feasibility Study on the Use of Internet in Elections, supra note 65 at 12-13.
70. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim
Report, supra note 5 at para 92.
71. Bartlett, Smith & Acton, supra note 3 at 40.
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bubbles (algorithmically-selected content based on presumptions of the user’s
interests), which magnify confirmation biases.72
Fourth, big data campaign practices based on incorrect information about
voters or faulty techniques of analysis can limit interactions between candidates
and voters. If a party relies on data analysis based on faulty inferences that
draw incorrect conclusions about a voter’s persuadability, the party could fail
to contact a voter who actually could have been swayed. If a candidate sends
direct mail advertising with strong messaging to an eligible voter who is slightly
undecided but is leaning towards the opposing candidate, then the advertising
could inadvertently provoke the voter to vote for the opposing candidate.73 Not
only are individuals with an incorrect persuadability score less likely to hear the
platforms that they would have been receptive to, they may also be systematically
excluded from the process of shaping the party’s platforms.
Fifth, parties’ use of detailed voter profiles has privacy implications for
individuals regardless of whether the data profiles lead to accurate inferences.
Whether or not big data collection and analysis is accurate enough to help the
campaigns, there are significant privacy implications of campaigns collecting,
storing, and analyzing vast amounts of personal information about voters and
making important decisions about voters’ “persuadability” based on that analysis.
The logic of big data is that there is never enough: More data supposedly produces
more accurate inferences. The incentives in data-driven campaigns will continue
to push for parties to collect ever more personal information about voters
continuously and ubiquitously in an effort to generate more accurate predictions
than the other campaigns.
At this stage, it is unclear whether big data analytics is producing the desired
effects for parties of better identifying likely voters and better honing messages
to persuade those people to vote. There are some indications that the advantages

72. See Cass R Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton University Press, 2001) (on echo chambers);
Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web is Changing What We Read and
How We Think (Penguin, 2012) (filter bubbles); Damian Tambini et al, “The New Political
Campaigning” (2017), online (pdf ): London School of Economics and Political Science
<eprints.lse.ac.uk/71945/7/LSE%20MPP%20Policy%20Brief%2019%20-%20The%20
new%20political%20campaigning_final.pdf> (on filter bubbles and campaigns); Natali
Hehlberger, “Exposure Plurality as a Policy Goal” (2012) 4 J Media L 65.
73. See SC Gwynne, “Retail Politics” (January 2006), online: Texas Monthly <www.texasmonthly.
com/articles/retail-politics> at 1.
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to the parties of extensive data profiles may be exaggerated.74 One study found
a single Facebook like by a voter for a politician in a multi-party system predicts
voter intention as accurately as hundreds of heterogeneous likes.75 Weighing
the potential benefits and harms of big data campaigning for the quality and
extent of individuals’ interactions with political parties and for voter privacy is
a complicated exercise. The personal information collected, stored, analyzed,
and used by political parties fuels a host of strategies whose aggregate impact on
democratic politics is not clear at this stage in the evolution of the technologies.
If it is working as its proponents claim and the parties deploying these techniques
hope, big data analytics facilitates political engagement and voter persuasion:
It helps parties to be responsive to voters’ concerns and to communicate to voters
in the manner most conducive to voters understanding parties’ policies and being
persuaded to vote for them. Even the rosiest picture of the use of big data in
federal politics, however, must acknowledge that it has transformed campaigning
and the practices of political parties in significant ways that should be addressed,
including safeguarding voter privacy. An optimistic view of the benefits of big
data in politics does not justify the hands-off attitude of current electoral and
privacy law toward political parties with regard to voter privacy. We turn in the
next section to explaining why the existing legal framework is flawed and does
not adequately protect voter privacy.

74. See e.g. Colin Bennett, “How Campaign ‘Micro-Targeting’ Works—And Why It
Probably Doesn’t” (9 September 2015), online: iPolitics <ipolitics.ca/2015/09/09/
how-campaign-micro-targeting-works-and-why-it-probably-doesnt/> (on the inability to
determine whether political campaigns are successful because of their reliance on big data or
in spite of it).
75. Jakob Bæk Kristensen et al, “Parsimonious Data: How a Single Facebook Like Predicts
Voting Behavior in Multiparty Systems” (2017) 12 PLoS ONE e0184562, online: <doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184562> (finding that “a few, but selective digital traces produce
prediction accuracies that are on par or even greater than most current approaches based
upon bigger and broader datasets”). See also Joshua L Kella & David E Broockman, “The
Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from
49 Field Experiments” (2018) 112 Am Pol Sci Rev 148 at 148 (finding that, based on a
meta-analysis of 49 field experiments, “the best estimate of the effects of campaign contact
and advertising on Americans’ candidate choices in general elections is zero”).
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II. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR VOTER PRIVACY
A. THE PRIVACY ACT AND PIPEDA

Privacy concerns with voter data arise not only because of the centrality of
personal information to the activities of political parties and the availability of
ever-more sophisticated technologies with which to analyse it, but also because
those activities are largely unregulated by privacy legislation or by elections law.76
Although the CEA confers some protections to voters’ personal information,77
it does not specifically regulate voter privacy nor significantly restrict the use of
personal information by political parties if used for purposes related to elections.78
Further, even though electors may opt out of the Register,79 political parties can
continue to collect information about voters who have exercised their opt-out.
Political parties are not currently subject to federal privacy legislation
regarding the collection, storage, and use of personal information. The two main
pieces of privacy legislation federally are the Privacy Act and PIPEDA. Political
parties are clearly not covered by the Privacy Act, which applies to the public
sector. Canada’s Privacy Act was designed with the intent to “protect the privacy
of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by
a government institution” and to “provide individuals with a right of access to
that information.”80 The Privacy Act applies only to “government institutions.”81
“Government institution” is defined under section 3 of the Privacy Act as “any
department or ministry of state of the Government of Canada, or any body
or office, listed in the schedule, and…any parent Crown corporation, and any
wholly-owned subsidiary of such a corporation….”82 Political parties are heavily
76. See Fenwick McKelvey & Jill Piebiak, “Does the Difference Compute? Data-Driven
Campaigning in Canada,” in Mireille Lalancette, Vincent Raynauld, & Erin Crandall, eds,
What’s Trending in Canadian Politics? Understanding Transformations in Power, Media, and the
Public Sphere (UBC Press, 2019) at 208; Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties
and Personal Privacy Protection, supra note 32.
77. As noted above, s 2(1) of the CEA adopts the same definition for “personal information”
as that used in s 3 of Canada’s Privacy Act. See CEA, supra note 8, s 2(1); Privacy Act,
supra note 6, s 3.
78. CEA, supra note 8, s 111(f ). The provision states that “no person shall… (f ) knowingly use
personal information that is recorded in a list for a purpose other than (i) to enable registered
parties, eligible parties, members or candidates to communicate with electors in accordance
with section 110, or (ii) a federal election or referendum.”
79. Elections Canada, “Description of the National Register of Electors,” supra note 21.
80. Privacy Act, supra note 6, s 2.
81. Ibid, s 3.
82. Ibid.
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regulated by electoral regulation but are independent, private entities. They are
not departments or ministries or Crown corporations for purposes of section 3
and are not mentioned in the Schedule. Political parties therefore operate outside
of the Privacy Act.
PIPEDA is the federal privacy legislation pertaining to the private sector.
Although political parties are not explicitly exempt from the statute, they are
outside its jurisdiction when engaged in traditional political activities. PIPEDA
applies to all provinces except the three provinces that have “substantially similar”
private-sector data protection legislation.83 PIPEDA incorporates the set of ten
fair information principles that are commonly used internationally in legislation
and regulatory instruments as a framework to protect personal information.84
Personal information is defined in PIPEDA as “information about an identifiable
individual,”85 which is a broad enough phrase that it would otherwise capture
information about voters gathered by parties. PIPEDA applies, however, only
to an organization that “collects, uses, or discloses [personal information] in
the course of commercial activities.”86 “Commercial activities” are defined as
“any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct
that is of a commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of
donor, membership or other fundraising lists.”87 Political parties must have a
“political purpose” in order to be registered under the Canada Elections Act.88
Parties generally do not engage in “commercial activities” within the meaning
of PIPEDA when they are engaged in activities that have a “political” purpose.89
Political parties, accordingly, would generally be unregulated by PIPEDA in how
they collect, store, and use data about voters. This would be true even if the

83. See Alberta, Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5; British Columbia, Personal
Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [BC PIPA]; Québec, An Act Respecting the
Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, RSQ c P-39.1.
84. The ten fair information principles are: (1) Accountability; (2) Identifying Purposes;
(3) Consent; (4) Limiting Collection; (5) Limiting, Use, Disclosure, and Retention; (6)
Accuracy; (7) Safeguards; (8) Openness; (9) Individual Access; and (10) Challenging
Compliance. See PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule I.
85. PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 2(1). Personal information also includes inferences about an
identifiable individual. See e.g. ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 30.
86. PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 4(1) (emphasis added).
87. Ibid, s 2(1).
88. CEA, supra note 8, s 2(1).
89. Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection, supra
note 32.
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parties obtain voter data from a commercial organization such as a databroker
that is itself subject to PIPEDA.90
B. OTHER LEGISLATION ON VOTER PRIVACY

There are other pieces of potentially relevant legislation that provide rights
related to the control of personal information or that protect voter privacy in
limited contexts. First, provincial privacy law applies in British Columbia to
riding associations of both provincial and federal political parties in the province.
In British Columbia, the Personal Information and Protection Act (PIPA) defines
the “organizations” to which it applies more broadly than the definition of
“organization” under PIPEDA.91 While it has been clear that the BC provincial
privacy statute’s broader definition applied to provincial political parties, the
BC Information and Privacy Commissioner has ruled that it also applies to
the electoral district associations in the province of federal parties registered
under the CEA.92
There are also federal statutes beyond PIPEDA and the CEA that may be
relevant to voter information in some situations. The Access to Information Act93
permits individuals to request information on specific topics from a “government
institution,”94 and thus might seem to provide an avenue for individuals to access
the information that parties hold about them. Political parties are not subject to
the access to information regime, however, by virtue of their exclusion from the
list of “government institutions” subject to the Access to Information Act.95
The Telecommunications Act and associated rules and regulations apply to
some aspects of communications between political entities and voters, including

90. It is possible that a political party could be engaging in a “commercial activity” for purposes
of PIPEDA, if, for example, it were to sell membership lists for non-political purposes. See
PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 2(1).
91. BC PIPA, supra note 83, s 3(1) (defining organization to include a person, an unincorporated
association, a trade union, a trust, and a non-profit organization); ibid, s 3(2) (exceptions,
which do not apply to political parties); PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 2(1) (defining organization
to include an association, partnership, a person, and a trade union).
92. Re Courtenay-Alberni Riding Association of the New Democratic Party of Canada (28 August
2019), 2019 BCIPC 34, Order P19-02 online (pdf ): <oipc.bc.ca/orders/2331> [Order
P19-02]. The ruling held that because the pith and substance of PIPA was to regulate data
protection and not to regulate elections, it was not unconstitutional for the provincial privacy
statute to apply to federal parties. Ibid at paras 1, 95.
93. RSC 1985, c A-1.
94. Ibid, s 2(1).
95. Ibid, Schedule I.
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email, phone, and text contacts.96 Political parties and candidates are exempt
from the National Do Not Call List that pertains to unsolicited telemarketing
calls, but they must maintain an internal do-not-call list.97 The principled reason
for their exemption is that parties need to be able to communicate directly with
voters (including by telephone), and therefore, if individuals were allowed to
block contact from parties, it would undermine a relationship that is necessary
in a democracy. A less charitable reading would be that the Parliamentarians
who voted on the law may have had their own interests in mind in exempting
candidates, parties, and other political entities.
Political parties are also largely excluded from national anti-spam legislation,
which limits unsolicited email communications, if parties are soliciting opinions
or contributions.98 However, there are regulations to increase transparency around
communications with voters during elections.99 The Canadian Radio-Television
and Communications Commission (CRTC) and Elections Canada have signed a
joint memorandum of understanding on how to jointly regulate “Voter Contact
Calling Services” during elections.100 Both the CRTC and Elections Canada have
legislative roles, under the Telecommunications Act and the CEA respectively,
to regulate communications with electors. These rules and agency practices have
restricted some forms of voter contact.101 The CRTC oversees a “Voter Contact
Registry” to protect Canadians from misleading phone calls during elections
and increase accountability.102 Political parties and candidates are also prohibited
96. SC 1993, c 38, s 41.7. See CRTC, “Rules for Unsolicited Telecommunications Made
on Behalf of Political Entities” (17 March 2019), online: CRTC <crtc.gc.ca/eng/phone/
telemarketing/politi.htm> (for a summary of the Telecommunications Act).
97. The Do Not Call List has exceptions permitting unsolicited telemarketing calls from political
parties, candidates, and riding associations, as well as registered Canadian charities, pollsters,
and newspapers. See CRTC, “Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules” (31 March 2013) at
Part II, online: CRTC <crtc.gc.ca/eng/trules-reglest.htm>.
98. An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain
activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities,
and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the
Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the
Telecommunications Act, SC 2010, c 23 at s 13 [“Anti-Spam Legislation”].
99. For an overview of the applicable rules, see CRTC, “Rules for Unsolicited
Telecommunications Made on Behalf of Political Entities,” supra note 97.
100. Memorandum from CRTC & Elections Canada, “Memorandum of Understanding” (1
April 2015), online: Elections Canada <elections.ca/content.aspx?section=abo&dir=mou/
crtc&document=index&lang=e>.
101. Telecommunications Act, supra note 96, ss 41-41.7, 72.01-72.15; CEA, supra note 8,
ss 348.02, 348.03, 348.04.
102. CEA, supra note 8, ss 348.02, 348.03, 348.04.
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from using pre-recorded “robocalls” to contact voters for solicitations unless there
is explicit consent.103
This balanced approach of allowing political parties to contact voters
who have not opted out, but regulating the contact to reduce fraudulent and
misleading communications, is sound for an electoral democracy where informed
individual participation is important. Without the connection between voters
and those that seek to represent them, electoral democracy cannot function
properly. Democracy requires individual participation and that parties be able
to interact with those whom their candidates seek to represent. Parties need to
know the concerns of the electorate in order to represent them in a democracy.
At the same time, voter privacy is an important consideration. With reference to
the Voter Contact Registry, the CRTC explains that “the desire to connect with
voters must be tempered with respect for Canadians’ privacy and the protection
of their right to refuse to be contacted by individuals or political groups if they
so choose.”104 These CRTC rules address voter privacy in the specific context
of unsolicited telecommunications to voters on behalf of political entities. But
they were not designed to have, and have not had, a meaningful impact on voter
privacy in general and do not attempt to address big data analytics.
C. SELF-REGULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES

Before 2018, in the absence of any clear legislative requirements on voter privacy,
political parties regulated themselves through their own privacy policies.105 All
of the major federal parties, the Liberal Party of Canada, Conservative Party of
Canada, New Democratic Party, Bloc Québécois, and Green Party of Canada,

103. CRTC, “Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules,” supra note 97 at Part IV.
104. CRTC, “Protecting You from Rogue and Misleading Calls During Elections” (25 July 2019),
online: CRTC <crtc.gc.ca/eng/phone/rce-vcr/guidecan.htm#infograph-can>.
105. See Dara Lithwick, “Privacy and Politics: Federal Political Parties’ Adherence to Recognized
Fair Information Principles” (2016) 10 JPPL 39; Colin J Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections
and Political Parties in Canada: Privacy Implications, Privacy Policies and Privacy
Obligations” (2018) 16 CJLT 195 [Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections”].
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have privacy policies available on their websites.106 These policies, however,
do not explicitly reference the use of the parties’ respective voter management
systems and offer relatively little detail on the type of data that is stored in
their databases and the manner in which it is used. It is difficult, because of
the policies’ vague wording, for voters to know whether their provisions pertain
solely to the political parties’ websites or apply to a fuller range of their activities,
including the databases.107 The parties’ privacy policies accord individuals some
rights consistent with fair information principles, modified to account for federal
elections requirements such as recordkeeping pertaining to campaign financing.
The parties’ level of compliance with their own internal policies has been unclear,
however, because prior to the CEA amendments in 2018 the parties did not have
privacy reporting obligations and post-2018 there are only minimal ones.108
The parties’ privacy policies include some statements about the downstream
uses of personal information, such as whether voter data may be shared with,
or sold to, data intermediaries, or whether voter information can be shared with
local ridings. The policies have not been explicit about data procurement, such
as whether personal information is obtained from third-party aggregators.109
It has also been unclear whether voter data is surrendered to outside entities.110
Nor has it been clear what data security measures (e.g., encryption and
prohibiting data transfer to USB keys) political parties are currently using to
protect voters’ personal information against hacking and other data leaks.111 The
Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s outward facing national
security agency, concluded in recent reports that a lack of security protections
106. See Liberal Party of Canada, “Privacy Policy” (last visited 25 October 2020), online: Liberal
Party of Canada <liberal.ca/privacy>; Conservative Party of Canada, “Privacy Policy”
(last visited 25 October 2020), online: Conservative Party of Canada <conservative.ca/
privacy-policy>; Green Party of Canada, “Important Information and Privacy Policy” (last
visited 25 October 2020), online: Green Party of Canada <greenparty.ca/en/privacy>; BLOC
Québécois, “Politique de protection des renseignements personnels” (last visited 25 October
2020), online: BLOC Québécois <www2.blocquebecois.org/politique-de-protection-desrenseignements-personnels>; New Democratic Party of Canada, “Privacy Policy” (last visited
25 October 2020), online: New Democratic Party of Canada <ndp.ca/privacy>.
107. See Colin Bennett, “So You Just Want Politicians to Leave You Alone? Good Luck With
That” (24 August 2015), online: iPolitics <ipolitics.ca/2015/08/24/so-you-just-wantpoliticians-to-leave-you-alone-good-luck-with-that>; Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra
note 105; Judge & Pal, “Privacy and the Electorate,” supra note 49.
108. CEA, supra note 8, s 385(2)(k), s 385(4), s 385.1
109. Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra note 105.
110. Howard & Kreiss, supra note 42 at 28.
111. See Bennett & Bayley, Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection, supra
note 32 at 22-24 (for an account of some notable voter privacy breaches in Canada).
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for the data that political parties hold about voters contributes to parties being
targeted by hostile foreign entities for digital interference.112
Under self-regulation, the existing political parties’ privacy policies have
varied with regard to consent.113 The parties’ practices, unclear privacy policies,
and vulnerabilities with respect to parties’ data acquisition, data sales, and data
security have significant implications for voter privacy and undermine voters’
ability to meaningfully decide whether to consent to their data being collected
and used. It is difficult for individuals to understand what data parties hold about
them and what they are doing with it. The policies are unclear about which
activities are covered under the policies and particularly unhelpful about key
aspects of big data practices, such as the type of data that is collected and the
sources from which it is obtained. A party could have multiple privacy policies,
produced for different purposes, not all of which are comprehensive or made
publicly available online. Although each policy may be requested by the public,
it is difficult for someone to know that policies other than those online even exist
so as to be able to make such a request.114
There is also a lack of transparency around political parties’ use of databrokers,
the degree to which campaigns rely on them, and whether the resulting profiles
are accurate predictors of voter behaviour. In addition, it is difficult to determine
with exactitude the types of inferences that are being made, the precise volume of
data on each prospective voter, the precision of their micro-targeting techniques,
the efficacy of such techniques, the types of messages delivered to voters, the use
of such tactics outside the election period, and the extent to which some people
are at risk of being excluded from political messages simply by virtue of their
persuadability score.
Self-regulation of voter privacy by political parties has been wholly insufficient
for voter privacy protection. Political parties are heavily regulated entities in nearly
all other aspects. They are exempt from current privacy law because MPs, who are
overwhelmingly affiliated with a political party, have not made political parties
subject to the privacy rules that apply to the public and private sectors. With
112. Communications Security Establishment, Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process
(Communications Security Establishment, 2017) [CSE, Cyber Threats]; Communications
Security Establishment, 2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process
(Communications Security Establishment, 2019) [CSE, 2019 Update]. See also David Thaw,
“From Russia with Love” (2019) University of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No
2019-32, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3038308>.
113. See Judge & Pal, SSHRC Knowledge Synthesis Grant, supra note 49; Bennett, “Data-Driven
Elections,” supra note 105.
114. McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 35.
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the widespread use of big data analytics among federal political parties, the legal
status quo is unsustainable. The potential for the misuse of personal information
about individual voters is enormous. There is no enforcement mechanism for
violations of a party’s privacy policy and, indeed, a voter is unlikely to even hear
about any misuse as there is no reporting obligation either. The regulation of
databrokers and intermediaries, as commercial entities subject to PIPEDA, may
provide some protection for voter information, but it does not protect voters
once the data is in the hands of parties, which can acquire, analyze, and share the
data without regulatory restraint if they do so for a political purpose.
Parliament sought to address some of these deficiencies in 2018 with the
voter privacy provisions of the EMA. Though an important first step, we argue
in the next section that these amendments in the EMA were inadequate to
protect voter privacy.
D. THE START OF MEANINGFUL REGULATION? THE ELECTIONS
MODERNIZATION ACT

The 2018 EMA is the first time that Parliament has obliged parties to address the
voter privacy issue and hence moves, to a modest degree, away from the largely
self-regulatory model that previously prevailed. The EMA mandates that political
parties adopt a “policy for the protection of personal information.”115 Existing
parties must file privacy policies with Elections Canada, provide a public internet
link to the policy, name an officer responsible for administering the policy, and
ensure updates are transmitted to Elections Canada. According to the CEA,
parties must specify the types of information they collect and how they do so,
how they protect and use that information, whether the information is sold,
how they train those who have access to the information, and their practices
regarding the collection of information online and use of cookies.116 The penalties
for breaching the obligations in the EMA are significant, with parties that fail
to comply facing potential deregistration.117 Deregistration means that a party
would no longer have the benefits of party status under the CEA and could not
contest federal elections as a single entity. New parties will have their applications
for registered party status rejected if they do not comply with the privacy policy
requirements in the EMA.118

115.
116.
117.
118.

CEA, supra note 8, s 385(2), as amended by EMA, supra note 13, s 254(1).
CEA, supra note 8, ss 385(2)(k), 385(4), 385.1.
Ibid, s 385.1(2).
Ibid.
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While an important first step, the measures in the EMA are still inadequate
to protect the personal information of voters. First, although the EMA requires
that each registered party have a privacy policy, the requirement is nominal. The
legislation simply outlines that the parties must have a privacy policy describing
their approach to data collection, retention, and use, but it does not impose
substantive privacy criteria for these policies. It does not require that they
adhere to the fair information practices set out in PIPEDA or the Privacy Act,
nor does it establish other privacy standards tailored to political parties. As the
BC Information and Privacy Commissioner described of the limited import of
section 385 of the CEA, “it imposes no substantive requirements relating to the
collection, use or disclosure of personal information,” and is “in substance merely
a transparency measure.”119 Hence the EMA codifies the existing, flawed practice
under self-regulation whereby parties have privacy policies, but where the policies
have little impact on the actual protection of voter privacy.120
Second, there is no enforcement mechanism to examine the accuracy and
sufficiency of statements made by the parties. Deregistration is a blunt instrument
that is rarely used by the CEO, and it is difficult to imagine a CEO deregistering
one of the major parties for failing to update its privacy policy. New parties can
easily meet the standard by simply having a policy that states what they choose to
do. There is no authority for the CEO to sanction a party for breaching its own
rules or for adopting rules that fall below some minimum standard since threshold
standards are not specified by the amendments. In jointly prepared guidance in
2019 for political parties to comply with the new EMA requirements, the Office
of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) and CEO remarked that “the new law
prescribes some elements of content [but] it does not require that content comply
with international privacy standards.”121 Their guidance accordingly consisted
of one page on the legally proscribed content and several pages on hortatory
recommendations. Open Media, in a 2019 report, examined whether federal
parties’ policies complied with the joint guidance on recommended practices and

119. Order P19-02, supra note 92, at para 70.
120. See Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra note 105.
121. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Guidance for Federal Political Parties on
Protecting Personal Information” (1 April 2019), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/
collecting-personal-information/gd_pp_201904> [OPC, “Guidance for Federal
Political Parties”].
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found, at best, that the parties attained partial credit in some areas and, in most
cases, they had failing grades.122
Third, the EMA is revealing with regard to some existing political party
practices. Section 385(2)(k)(iii) of the CEA (as amended by the EMA) requires
parties to set out in their official policies “under what circumstances that personal
information [collected by the party] may be sold to any person or entity.”123
The legislation thus acknowledges, but does not prohibit, the practice of parties
commercializing voter data; this has further problematic implications as it
suggests that the sale of voter data by political parties is also not covered as a
“commercial activity” under PIPEDA.
The EMA is therefore no more than a first step. It expands the regulatory
ambitions of the CEA to include voter privacy and the protection of personal
information, which is an important move forward. Without further reforms,
however, the EMA will be incomplete and potentially harmful if it provides
the illusion of movement toward voter privacy and decreases the urgency
around the issue.

III. REFORMING VOTER PRIVACY: BEYOND THE EMA
Canadian law needs to be updated to reflect the serious repercussions for voter
privacy of digital campaigning and data-driven elections. The current legal
framework under both elections law and privacy law is inadequate for voter
privacy. The status quo of self-regulation by political parties, augmented by the
requirement from the EMA that all parties have a privacy policy, does not provide
adequate privacy protection through elections law. The amendments in the EMA
were minor and, more formal than substantive, did not provide significant
privacy protection to voters. Privacy law, meanwhile, has left political parties out
of both the public and private sector legislation. In this Part, we detail how voters’
privacy should be protected and how political parties should be regulated.
There are several plausible legislative options for regulating political parties
to protect voter privacy. The first option would be to include political parties
under one of the existing federal privacy statutes. The second main legislative
option would be to amend the CEA again to impose privacy obligations on
122. Open Media, “Canada’s Political Parties Privacy Policies: An Assessment Against Best
Practices Defined by Elections Canada and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner” (2019),
online: <openmedia.org/article/item/how-do-they-score-we-rated-new-privacy-policies-allmajor-parties-and-every-single-one-failed-key>.
123. EMA, supra note 13, s 254(1).

Judge, Pal, Voter Privacy and Big-Data Elections

29

parties that are stricter than those added in 2018 by the relatively anemic privacy
provisions in the EMA.124
A. EXISTING PRIVACY LEGISLATION: THE PRIVACY ACT AND PIPEDA

Placing political parties under the auspices of either of the existing privacy
statutes would be counter-productive. The Privacy Act is not a realistic model
given that political parties, although heavily regulated, are still private entities
and very different from the government departments and Crown corporations
subject to that law. If political parties were to be incorporated under the ambit
of one of the existing federal privacy statutes, the critical consensus has leaned
heavily toward PIPEDA as the better option.125
The problem with the PIPEDA approach, however, is that PIPEDA has
been widely criticized for being out of date, inadequately addressing new
technologies, lacking strong investigatory and enforcement mechanisms, and not
implementing higher standards for privacy protection in the private sector.126
There have frequently been calls from Parliament and the academic community
to revise PIPEDA.127 The Trudeau government’s proposed “Digital Charter”
of May 2019 signalled its intent to significantly amend PIPEDA.128 Due to a lack
of details in the Digital Charter, it remains to be seen precisely how it would do
so and the extent of the changes. It is also not clear whether those changes will
be implemented, given that the Liberal government was reduced to a minority in
the October 2019 federal election.
Merely incorporating political parties in PIPEDA’s existing framework
without also making significant changes to PIPEDA would not provide adequate
privacy for voters. As PIPEDA has not been updated for algorithmic processing,
even if political parties were to be added to the jurisdiction of PIPEDA it
would not prevent political parties from engaging in big data practices; rather,
124. A third possibility would be stand-alone legislation with a privacy framework specifically
designed for parties, but this approach seems unlikely, in our view, given the existence of
federal electoral and privacy legislation. We do not consider this option in detail here. In any
event, our recommendations on the content and jurisdiction would be the same.
125. See Bennett, “Data-Driven Elections,” supra note 105; Lithwick, supra note 105; ETHI,
Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5.
126. See ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5 at 5-6, 20-32, 60-69; OPC, Trust but
Verify, supra note 5.
127. See ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5 at 8-11 (on attempts at legislative
amendment), 16-18 (on academic criticism regarding consent).
128. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Strengthening Privacy for the
Digital Age: Proposals to Modernize the Personal Information Protection and Electronics
Documents Act, (2019), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00107.html> [ISEDC].
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it would oblige the parties to adhere to fair information principles, including
notice and consent.129 But fair information principles, which already govern the
private sector, have not protected Canadians against the mass data collection and
analysis of their personal information. The problem is not that political parties
have been left out of an effective privacy statute; if true, that could be remediated
by amending PIPEDA to incorporate political parties. Rather, the problem is
more far reaching as the existing privacy legislation has not worked well. Among
other issues, PIPEDA suffers from a weak notion of consent that has failed to
stem vast collection of data about individuals, weak enforcement mechanisms
that has left the OPC with few serious compliance measures, and a legislative
framework that has not been adequately updated to account for the seismic shifts
wrought by big data.130
B. THE CANADA ELECTIONS ACT

The second option is to place the reforms in the main electoral legislation, the
CEA. One of the main virtues of doing so is that Elections Canada is the agency
with specialised and deep expertise in election administration. The CEA already
regulates parties extensively and assigns responsibility for administering those
provisions to the CEO. Parties are private entities, but with an important public
role as an intermediary institution between voters and government. Elections
Canada is in regular close contact with federal political parties as mandated
by statute,131 including through the provision of guidelines and interpretation
notes, which are answers to questions posed by the parties about the agency’s
interpretation of various legal or administrative matters,132 and the Advisory
Committee of Political Parties,133 where representatives of the parties provide

129. See PIPEDA, supra note 7.
130. See ISEDC, supra note 128; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Real Fears,
Real Solutions: A plan for restoring confidence in Canada’s privacy regime (Annual Report
to Parliament on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
and the Privacy Act) Catalogue No IP51-1E-PDF (2017), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/
opc-actions-and-decisions/ar_index/201617/ar_201617>; ETHI, Towards Privacy by
Design, supra note 5; ETHI, Towards Democracy Under Threat, supra note 5; Standing
Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, Driving Change: Technology and
the Future of the Automated Vehicle (January 2018) (Chair: David Tkachuk), online (pdf ):
<sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/TRCM/Reports/COM_RPT_TRCM_
AutomatedVehicles_e.pdf>.
131. See CEA, supra note 8, s 21.1.
132. Ibid, s 16.1-16.5.
133. Ibid, s 21.1(1)-(4).
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the CEO with “advice and recommendations.”134 Keeping electoral oversight
under one roof is appealing as it would build on Elections Canada’s existing
expertise. One of the criticisms of the amendments that addressed the “robocalls”
from the 2011 election was that it hived responsibility off to the CRTC, which
is not as steeped in electoral matters as Elections Canada.135 This approach
potentially meant losing the benefit of Elections Canada’s expertise in regulation
of “robocalls.” It also increased the burden on the regulated entities, namely the
parties themselves, to interact with multiple regulators.
The CEA has steadily expanded its ambit over the last several decades to
include regulation of entities and activities that were previously outside of
its reach, including leadership campaigns and contestants, electoral district
associations, social media platforms, and so on. The EMA took a first step to
including privacy as well. Adding content to the framework established by the
2018 amendments in relation to privacy would not be at odds with the approach
or scope of the CEA as a whole.
The drawback to this approach is that Elections Canada does not have
specific expertise with privacy. The entity with expertise on privacy at the federal
level is the OPC. While the CEO has expertise in dealing with political parties
and understands the nuances of the political process, the OPC has expertise
in data protection and understands the nuances of privacy-invasive activities.
The OPC has jurisdiction over both the Privacy Act and PIPEDA. Giving the
OPC jurisdiction over political parties in relation to voter privacy would be
consistent with their mission to “protect and promote privacy rights” and may
be most efficient from the perspective of individual voters. In either case, clear
statutory language would be needed in order to render the grant of authority to
oversee voter privacy to the particular agency. As Officers of Parliament, each is
constrained by their specific home statutes.
In a 2013 report, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada recommended
that legislation be amended to grant Elections Canada jurisdiction over privacy
breaches by political parties.136 The report states:
In order to preserve the confidence of Canadians in the political entities with whom
they deal, and in order to better protect the privacy of Canadian electors dealing
with political entities, it is recommended that the Canada Elections Act be amended

134. Ibid, s 21.1(2).
135. Michael Pal, “Electoral Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government” (2016) 21
Rev Con Studies 85 at 93.
136. Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Preventing Deceptive Communication with Electors
(Ottawa: Elections Canada, 2013) [CEO, “Preventing Deceptive Communications”].
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to provide a mechanism by which the application of privacy protection principles
governing most Canadian institutions and organizations would be extended to
political parties.137

Responding to the report, the OPC agreed with the recommendation to impose
privacy standards on political parties, but did not explicitly endorse the idea that
Elections Canada be given the mandate:
We welcome the report from Elections Canada, which highlights the fact that there
is currently a gap in coverage under federal privacy legislation and suggests measures
to address this gap. We feel this is an issue that warrants public discussion…We are
pleased to see a recommendation that political parties should be required to meet
these standards.138

Joint administration by both the federal privacy and election bodies is possible.
Along the model of the Copyright Act, which is jointly administered by Canadian
Heritage and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (formerly
Industry Canada), privacy obligations imposed on the political parties could be
jointly administered by the CEO and the OPC.139 This approach would have the
advantage of specifically balancing democratic processes with voter privacy and
could regulate political parties beyond defined campaign periods to acknowledge
parties’ continual interactions with the electorate.
If only one agency were to have jurisdiction over political parties’ data
practices, Elections Canada is the preferable option. Elections Canada is a
non-partisan and independent agency with a mandate to administer and monitor
compliance with the CEA and to conduct federal elections. It is likely to be better
able to balance the special context of protecting personal information about voters
along with the democratic need for political parties to be in communication with,

137. Ibid at 32.
138. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, News Release, “Statement
from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding a Report
by Elections Canada” (27 March 2013), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/
news-and-announcements/2013/nr-c_130327>.
139. ISEDC administers the Copyright Act through the Canadian Intellectual Property Office
and develops copyright policy jointly with the Copyright Policy Branch of Canadian
Heritage. See Canadian Intellectual Property Office, ISEDC, online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/
cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/Home>; Copyright Policy Branch, Canadian Heritage,
online: <www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/copyright-policy-branch.html>;
Canada, Minister of Canadian Heritage and Minister of Industry, Status Report on Copyright
Reform (24 March 2004), Submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Canadian Heritage (2005), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/rp01133.html>.
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and responsive to, voters. If this option is chosen, there should be amendments to
the CEA that specifically grant Elections Canada this authority.
C. CONCLUSION ON LEGISLATION

Given the deficiencies in existing privacy legislation, we favour more stringent
privacy protections specifically tailored to political parties and recommend
that they be implemented through the CEA and with jurisdiction granted to
the CEO. By separating oversight of voter privacy from the main agency on
privacy writ large, the OPC, this approach would also foster an appreciation for
how protection of voter privacy must be crafted with a view to the particular
relationship between voters and parties and the role of parties in a democracy.
The rest of this section details relevant considerations for crafting the content of
stronger privacy protection specific to voters and parties.
D. GUIDELINES FOR VOTER PRIVACY REFORM

Such a framework should situate voter privacy as a limit upon the activities of
political actors, but without stifling the connection between parties and voters
that is essential to democratic life. To the extent possible, both the choices voters
make about their own data and the ability of parties to be able to communicate
with the electorate should be respected. The legislative model of data protection
and its fair information principles are, at best, minimal requirements. Protecting
voter privacy with data-driven campaigning requires a stronger privacy regime.140
In the following guidelines, we acknowledge, but go beyond, fair information
principles to build a privacy framework that is tailored to the specific context
of voters and elections and that is cognizant of the particular impacts of big
data analytics.
1.

MANDATORY OBLIGATIONs

First, any privacy rules that apply to political parties must be mandatory. The
CEA does not rely on voluntary regulation by parties of their other activities that
are consequential to the electoral process and should not rely on self-regulation
with regard to the protection of voters’ personal information. The inadequacies
of the current self-regulatory regime for parties have already been detailed in
140. For arguments that fair information principles are inadequate to deal with the privacy risks
posed by big data, see Rubinstein, supra note 2 at 1; Woodrow Hartzog, “The Inadequate,
Invaluable Fair Information Principles” (2017) 76 Md L Rev 952 at 954; Anna Romanou,
“The Necessity of the Implementation of Privacy by Design in Sectors Where Data
Protection Concerns Arise” (2018) 34 Computer L & Security Rev 99 at 109.
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previous sections. There are compelling reasons why privacy standards in relation
to parties should have different content than those in other contexts that
apply to commercial or government entities. Parties have a unique role in the
constitutional, electoral, and democratic order. Their particular role, however,
does not displace the risk that self-regulation will lead to under-protection of
privacy, because stringent privacy standards would be at odds with the short-term
interests of parties. For example, mandatory disclosure of a data breach by a party
would expose them to critique and could even harm their electoral prospects
if the resulting harm was wide-spread and egregious enough. Rules on data
collection, to take another example, might restrict the information that ultimately
ends up with parties, and therefore hinder their attempts at micro-targeted
voter communications. Ensuring that voter privacy is protected would also cost
parties money and resources in additional labour and technical infrastructure,
compounded by the lack of continuity in staffing and the rapid and large spikes
in temporary personnel during campaigns.
Parties could adopt the view that voter privacy is important as a matter of
principle or that their long-term interests are better served by the trust that could
be generated if voters have faith that their personal information, if acquired, will
not be unduly harvested or misused. There is a large literature in Canada, however,
on how narrow interpretations of a party’s own partisan and electoral self-interest
often shape the decisions of governments around electoral legislation.141 There is
no reason to assume that voter privacy would somehow escape the partisan lenses
that shape the laws regulating elections more generally.
It could be countered that parties should be left as unregulated as possible
as a general matter so that the state does not interfere in their internal workings,
and that this principle suggests that the government could nudge parties to
protect voter privacy but should not impose hard regulations.142 However,
this hands-off approach of self-regulation coupled with rhetorical support for
141. See Heather MacIvor, “Do Canadian Political Parties Form a Cartel?” (1996) 29 Can J Pol
Sci 317; Colin Feasby, “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process”
(2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 237; Michael Pal, “Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the
Law of Canadian Democracy” (2011) 57 McGill LJ 299 at 319-21; Yasmin Dawood,
“Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights Approach to Judicial
Review” (2012) 62 UTLJ 499.
142. See Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth,
and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008) (drawing on behavioural economics for a
“libertarian paternalism” approach in which government provides choice architecture to
nudge people toward decisions preferred by the government without mandating conduct
through hard law).

Judge, Pal, Voter Privacy and Big-Data Elections

35

privacy protections effectively exists now and has fallen short. Parties have not
been vigilant in protecting voter privacy and have not voluntarily refrained from
adopting practices and technologies that pose serious privacy risks to voters,
including big data analytics and reliance on data brokers. The parties’ incentives
in favour of data collection have been exacerbated by the low cost of data storage.
Self-regulation has been tried and has been insufficient to protect voter privacy.
Elections Canada and the BC Information and Privacy Commissioner
have suggested implementing a voluntary code of conduct for political parties,
including protections for personal information.143 The advantages of a voluntary
code are to provide more persuasive power to regulators, increase public trust
in parties, encourage the parties to coalesce around common practices, remind
parties of their duties to the public, support party members with ethical
concerns, and to be consistent with other sectors that have implemented codes
of ethics.144 Elections Canada’s 2020 discussion paper on voter privacy observed
that a “voluntary code may be more palatable to political parties than legislated
change, while at the same time moving towards increasing electors’ privacy.”145
However, a voluntary code of conduct would be susceptible to the same problems
that have afflicted the current self-regulatory approach where, in the absence of
a statutory mandate, the incentives for parties have been in favour of collecting
more information about voters to obtain an electoral advantage. A voluntary
code might simply reiterate the statutory obligations that already exist, on the
one hand, or be too vague or general to provide practical guidance, on the other
hand.146 In the absence of statutory requirements to protect voter privacy, coupled

143. Elections Canada, “A Code of Ethics or Code of Conduct for Political Parties as a
Potential Tool to Strengthen Electoral Democracy in Canada” (2018), online: <www.
elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/tech/cod&document=table&lang=e> [EC,
“Code of Ethics”].
144. McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 43-44.
145. Elections Canada, Political Communications in the Digital Age, Discussion Paper 3: The
Protection of Electors’ Personal Information in the Federal Electoral Context (May 2020) at 17,
online: <www.elections.ca/res/cons/dis/compol/dis3/dis3_e.pdf>.
146. See EC, “Code of Ethics,” supra note 143. Indeed, it is suggestive that PIPEDA, which has
been criticized as a “creature of compromise” attributable to its original drafting style, is itself
a result of codifying a model code that originated as a self-regulatory scheme for business.
ISEDC, supra note 128, at Part 4.
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with enforcement powers to secure compliance, the parties are unlikely to effect
strong change on their own.147
2.

CONTINuOus APPLICATION OF PRIVACY OBLIGATIONs

Second, privacy protections should apply continuously, rather than being time
limited or tied to an electoral event, to align with the full-year and years-long
campaign strategies of political parties. Rules limited to specific election periods
have been problematic in other contexts. For example, the rules limiting spending
by political parties and third parties are restricted to the official campaign period,
beginning with the drawing up of the writ and ending on election day. The EMA
introduced a slightly longer period in which spending is regulated, by imposing
a pre-writ spending limit that begins on June 30 of an election year in the lead
up to the fixed date vote in October.148 These time-based restrictions create an
obvious loophole, as political and third parties have incentives to advertise in
the unregulated period where no spending limit applies.149 Another factor is
the lack of continuity in political parties’ staff. During campaigns, parties see
rapid influxes of temporary personnel who often have access to troves of voter
information without adequate privacy training to protect it.150 To avoid creating
any gaps in privacy protection, any privacy rules that apply to parties should
apply at all times, and not simply during the official election campaign or the
immediate pre-writ period. The counter argument against continuous restrictions
on spending limits is primarily a constitutional one. As spending on advertising is
covered by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (“Charter”) guarantee of
free political expression in section 2(b), restrictions over a longer time frame are

147. If Canada were to implement a statutory code, oversight could be placed either with the
Commissioner of Canada Elections, who is located in the Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions, or with Elections Canada since the 2014 changes in the FEA. See FEA, supra
note 30; EC, “Code of Ethics,” supra note 143. The UK ICO recommended a statutory code
of conduct. See ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3, at 44. The ICO has since issued a
draft framework for a code of conduct. See United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s
Office, Guidance on Political Campaigning: Draft Framework Code for Consultation (2019),
online (pdf ): <ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2615563/guidance-on-politicalcampaigning-draft-framework-code-for-consultation.pdf>.
148. EMA, supra note 13, s 349.1.
149. Pal, “Is the Permanent Campaign the End of the Egalitarian Model of Elections?,” supra note 8.
150. See McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 29 (recommending that political parties in
BC provide employee and volunteer training plans and materials before they can receive
the voter lists).
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more harmful to individual rights holders.151 But this has to be weighed against
the right to privacy and democratic principles.
3.

PROTECT INDIVIDUAL VOTERS RATHER THAN “VOTER DATA”

Third, legislation to protect voter privacy should focus on protecting the privacy
of voters and not simply protecting the category of “voter data.” Data about
individuals does not fit neatly into boxes. It may be characterised as “voter
data” when political parties use it for political purposes such as determining the
persuadability of voters; however, the same data deployed for a different purpose
by a different actor may be characterised as “consumer data” or “advertising data.”
With big data analytics, what political parties do is hard to differentiate from
what commercial actors do and is often based on commercial approaches. Both
are interested in commercial data, both draw inferences about preferences, and
both develop psychographic profiles about individuals. Political parties do this
to gauge the likelihood of voting and persuadability; commercial actors do so
to gauge the likelihood of buying and product preferences. Given the ubiquity,
fluidity, and variety of data, and the proclivity of political parties for extrapolating
political preferences from non-political data, it would be difficult to administer
a system that sharply differentiates between players in the data ecosystem, and
it would be difficult to provide effective privacy protection for voters in such a
segmented system. With the multitude of layers, actors, technologies, and data
sources involved, an effective regulatory measure should not depend on legislative
distinctions that are hard to administer. It should not differentiate between “voter
data” and other categories of data, between data from “political” sources and
non-political sources, or between data drawn from “political” activities and other
activities.152 Recognizing a separate category of “voter data” or a separate category
of “political” sources in the law would be at odds with how data ecosystems
actually operate in practice and the multiple channels of information drawn
upon by parties.
One could argue that if voter data cannot be disentangled from other data,
why not simply include political parties under PIPEDA along with commercial
entities? PIPEDA, as currently constituted, is inadequate for the regulation of
personal information and commercial entities, as detailed above, in Part II.A.,
and would likewise provide insufficient protection if it were to regulate voter
151. Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11, s 2(b).
152. See Roger A Ford, “Unilateral Invasion of Privacy” Notre Dame L Rev 1075 at 1083 (on the
difficulty of differentiating types of data). See Delacourt, supra note 37.
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data and political parties. While voter data is hard to differentiate from
other personal information, in our view it would be difficult or perhaps even
impossible to adequately accommodate the context of political parties even in
a reformed PIPEDA. The relationship between political parties and voters is
of a different kind than that between commercial entities and consumers. The
balance required to facilitate communication between parties and voters so as to
respect the foundational importance of that relationship in a democracy, while
respecting legitimate privacy concerns, is difficult enough to achieve on its own,
as the failure to do so to date in Canadian legislation demonstrates. Striking
that balance between facilitating democracy and upholding privacy would not
be possible if other concerns related to commercial entities and relationships
were added to the mix and if the legal mechanism to carry out that effort was
hampered by PIPEDA’s flaws.
4.

TECHNOLOGICAL NEuTRALITY AND FuTuRE-FOCusED REGuLATION

Fourth, Canada should adopt a technologically neutral approach in its regulation.
Protection for voter privacy would be undermined by even the best possible
legislative response if the reforms were explicitly tied to existing technologies
for collecting and analysing personal information. Technology and, as a result,
political campaigning, are rapidly evolving. Legislative protection for voter privacy
will be more effective if it is neutral with regard to the technology being used.
In other words, it should be broad enough to apply even to new technologies
that will inevitably develop, and which will, equally inevitably, be deployed by
campaigns and thus have an impact on voter privacy.
The importance of technological neutrality has been emphasised in related
areas of the law. The Supreme Court of Canada has supported the principle of
technological neutrality in various contexts whereby, unless there is Parliamentary
intent to the contrary, the statute “should not be interpreted or applied to favour
or discriminate against any particular form of technology,” and the statute’s
traditional balance “must be maintained across all technological contexts” and
“should be preserved in the digital environment.”153 Applying this principle,
voter privacy legislation should not attempt to specify the types of technology

153. Canadian Broadcasting Corp v SODRAC 2003 Inc, 2015 SCC 57 at paras 66-68.
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that are used to collect data, nor the methods that are used to analyse that data.154
As media and devices can change with different technologies, the legislation
should not be locked into a particular format, process, or source.
It is possible that, by being too general and abstract, privacy-focused reforms
might undermine their long-term effectiveness, as the particular details of
technologies or their uses matter. However, legislation crafted too specifically
around a particular technology is vulnerable to being outdated quickly. Similarly,
legislation designed around particular platforms or business models may be too
restricted and may make it difficult for all affected companies to comply. For
example, amendments introducing a requirement that social media platforms
maintain registries of political advertisements communicated on their sites were
heavily critiqued by some of the platforms for being designed around the technical
specifics of Facebook. Google, for instance, claimed that it was impossible for them
to comply with the new requirements, given how advertisements were placed on
their sites.155 Care should thus be taken to ensure that the intended subjects of
the regulatory regime are able to comply. The saga around the advertising registry
is a cautionary tale. Without technological neutrality, reforms may not achieve
the desired objective because they are too narrowly focused and, even if effective,
may quickly be obsolete because of technological developments. It is important
to note that even statutes designed to be technologically neutral, such as PIPEDA,
still reflect the concerns and practices made possible by the technologies of their
time,156 and thus the need for amendments for even a well-crafted statute will be
foreseeable at some future horizon. However, that time period can be lengthened
154. For example, although Europe’s modernization efforts to update privacy law to incorporate
automated processes are laudable, there are already critiques that the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) is not forward thinking enough in its language around the technologies.
See EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation) [2016] OJ 679/2016 [GDPR]. See Karen McCullagh, “The General Data
Protection Regulation: A Partial Success for Children on Social Network Sites?” in Tobias
Bräutigam & Samuli Miettinen, eds, Data Protection, Privacy and European Regulation in
the Digital Age (Unigrafia, 2016) 110 at 122, 127-29; Michael Butterworth, “The ICO and
Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Fairness in the GDPR Framework” (2018) 34 Computer
L & Sec Rev 257 at 265; Jenna Lindqvist, “New Challenges to Personal Data Processing
Agreements: is the GDPR Fit to Deal with Contract, Accountability and Liability in a World
of the Internet of Things?” (2018) 26 Intl JL & IT 45 at 61-63.
155. See Tom Cardoso, “Google to Ban Political Ads Ahead of Federal Election, Citing New
Transparency Rules” (4 March 2019), online: The Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.
com/politics/article-google-to-ban-political-ads-ahead-of-federal-election-citing-new>.
156. See ISEDC, supra note 128 at Part A: Possible Options—Consent and Transparency.
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by a commitment to technological neutrality in the design of the statutory
framework. Technological neutrality remains an essential aspect of any reform
likely to be meaningful in the long term.
5.

LIMIT DATA usE TO POLITICAL PuRPOsEs ONLY AND PROHIBIT
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

Fifth, the uses to which political parties can put voter data must be strictly tied
to their role in democracy. Parties should be permitted to use voter data only for
“political purposes,” meaning non-commercial activities. Parties play a key role in
democracy, but they are in a relatively privileged position. Even though the direct
per vote subsidy, which gave parties quarterly funding based on their vote totals
from the previous election, was eliminated, parties receive significant indirect
public financial support. The contributions that sustain their activities are subject
to generous tax rebates, far exceeding those in the charitable sector.157 Parties and
their candidates also receive significant reimbursement of the expenses that they
incur to contest elections.158 Registered parties have a variety of statutory and
even constitutional protections.159 This preferential treatment can be justified on
the basis that healthy parties are required for electoral democracy to function.
But permitting parties to use data for non-political purposes would unduly
permit them to use these financial benefits and rights outside of the realm of
electoral politics. This would be contrary to the reason for those benefits and
rights being conferred, which was strictly to have robust democratic competition
for votes and seats.
It is true that the definition of a “political party” in section 2 of the CEA
only requires that “one of [its] fundamental purposes is to participate in public
affairs by endorsing one or more of its members as candidates and supporting
their election.”160 One could interpret the definition not only to permit, but
even to anticipate, that parties would engage in non-political purposes. The
more persuasive reading of the definition, however, is that parties might engage
in activities other than endorsing candidates, such as fundraising, expressing
157. See Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 127(3).
158. See Elections Canada, “Total Paid Election Expenses and Reimbursements, by Registered
Political Party – 2015 General Election” (12 May 2020), online: <www.elections.ca/content.
aspx?section=fin&dir=oth/pol/remb&document=table1_15&lang=e> (for the most recent
publicly available reimbursement data).
159. See e.g. Figueroa, supra note 11. There, the Supreme Court found that onerous
rules depriving small political parties of the benefits conferred by registration were
unconstitutional for violating section 3 of the Charter.
160. CEA, supra note 8.
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political views, advertising, and so on. Although these activities might not always
be directly related to electing candidates, these other purposes for its behaviour
are assumed to be political rather than, say, religious or commercial or some other
shared purpose that the members might pursue.
Any discussion of potential commercial activities by parties raises the issue of
whether they should be allowed to sell valuable commodities that they hold, such
as voter data. Political parties should not be permitted to sell voter data to other
entities or transfer it to any entity seeking to use this information for commercial
gain. This rule is appropriate for several reasons. If parties were permitted to
sell voter data, individuals would likely be reluctant to provide information to
parties, which would hamper democracy more generally. Few individuals would
anticipate that indicating their voting preferences to a door-to-door canvasser,
“liking” a photo of a leader’s newborn baby, or sharing a photo of a candidate
would mean their information is transmitted for a price to a commercial entity
seeking to sell rafting tours, children’s clothes, or movie tickets.
It is not clear what public policy rationale would exist for continuing to permit
political parties to sell the data they have collected about voters to non-political
entities. Perhaps it could be justified as a necessary evil to provide the funds
parties need to operate. The generous, though indirect, public funds available to
parties undermine the strength of any such claim. Selling data provides money
to the parties but without improving parties’ ability to communicate with voters,
and it further hampers voter privacy.
The EMA merely requires that parties disclose their policy with regard to
selling data and does not restrict the practice. In doing so, it advances voter privacy
incrementally, without addressing the fundamental issue that the sale of voter data
by parties is harmful to democratic participation. Rather than permitting parties
to sell voter data only if individuals consent, we instead recommend establishing
a general rule that political parties are permitted to use personal information only
for political purposes and are banned from any commercial activity with respect
to voter data. Limiting the use of personal data to the purposes for which it was
collected is an established fair information principle,161 and the only defensible
use that political parties should make of data are those related to the parties’
political purpose.

161. See PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule 1, s 4.5, Principle 5 (stating “[u]nless the individual
consents otherwise or it is required by law, personal information can only be used or
disclosed for the purposes for which it was collected.”).
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6.

INFORMED CONSENT

Sixth, parties should be required to comply with the principle of informed
consent for all uses of personal data for political purposes. Consent is intended
to support autonomy by allowing individuals to choose what happens with
their personal information. Although consent is a central mechanism for data
protection legislation, it has not been effective in providing individuals with
real control or decision-making over their data. The OPC’s 2019 Guidelines
for Obtaining Meaningful Consent remarks that “advances in technology and
the use of lengthy, legalistic privacy policies have too often served to make the
control – and personal autonomy – that should be enabled by consent nothing
more than illusory.”162
This “illusion” of control is particularly salient for voters, who lack enough
information and enough alternatives to make consent meaningful in the context
of big data analytics by political parties.163 The information asymmetry endemic
to big data practices makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to know what
information parties have about them and how it is being used by parties. It is also
hard for voters to know what other entities have access to the data and where it
goes in their hands and to exercise meaningful choice about those downstream
uses. The lack of accountability in parties’ data practices will not improve much
with the 2018 elections law amendments, which require basic disclosures of
certain data activities but not voter consent. The EMA only requires parties to
disclose “the party’s practices concerning…the collection and use of personal
information created from online activity.”164 But it imposes no obligation that
the parties obtain voters’ consent for these data practices.
162. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful
Consent (24 May 2018), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/collecting-personalinformation/consent/gl_omc_201805> [OPC, Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful
Consent]. See also, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Consent”
(2019), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/collecting-personal-information/
consent>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Submissions Received for
the Consultation on Consent” (2016), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/
what-we-do/consultations/completed-consultations/consultation-on-consent-under-pipeda/
submissions-received-for-the-consultation-on-consent>.
163. See Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Interim
Report, supra note 5, at para 75 (noting that social media companies “give users the illusion of
users having freedom over how they control their data, but they make it extremely difficult,
in practice, for users to protect their data”). For the final report, see UK, Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report, Eighth Report of
Session 2017-19 (Cm 1791, 2019).
164. EMA, supra note 13, s 254(1)(v)(A).
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The practices for obtaining consent by the private sector are continuing to
develop, as showcased in the ETHI Committee’s report on updating PIPEDA
and in the OPC’s Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful Consent.165 Those
reports continue to support individual consent as a viable regulatory mechanism
and suggest ways to strengthen it. The OPC principles emphasize that consent is
“an ongoing process that changes as circumstances change” and should be treated
as “a dynamic and interactive process.”166 The intrusiveness of big data practices
should require more stringent consent.
We recommend that informed consent obligations apply to political parties.
Political parties should be required to obtain voters’ explicit consent and respond
to the privacy preferences that individuals hold. The applicable regulatory agency
should develop an informed consent policy, to which parties are required to
adhere, for in-person and online interactions with voters and also with respect to
the parties’ acquisition and analysis of voter data. Informed consent would require
that political parties provide individuals with information in a user-friendly form
about what data is being collected, how it is being collected, and whom it is
being shared with, and that individuals explicitly agree to the specific use of
their data.167 The policy should set out explicit threshold requirements for parties
setting out how and when parties must obtain consent, the data activities that
require consent, and the parties’ confidentiality obligations with respect to the
data. The responsible agency should periodically review the template informed
consent policy to update it for technology changes that affect voter privacy.
Political parties should generally be required to obtain informed consent for any
personal information, including inferences pertaining to individuals, such as
persuadability scores. Inferences about individuals should be treated as personal
information regardless of whether the inferences are accurate or predictive.168
165. ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5 at 25-28; OPC, Guidelines for Obtaining
Meaningful Consent, supra note 162.
166. OPC, Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful Consent, supra note 162.
167. PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 6.1 (which provides one version). See also Ontario Personal
Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Schedule A, s 18(5) (defining
“knowledgeable consent” as “if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the
individual knows, (a) the purposes of the collection, use or disclosure, as the case may be;
and (b) that the individual may give or withhold consent”).
168. See Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (UK), Disinformation and ‘Fake News’:
Final Report, supra note 163 at para 48 (supporting ICO’s recommendation that “inferred
data should be as protected under the law as personal information” and recommending
that the UK Government study how “the protections of privacy law can be expanded to
include models that are used to make inferences about individuals, in particular during
political campaigning”).
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Incorrect inferences may still have an impact on the individual about whom the
inference was made and should therefore be included as personal information.
For example, a party may wrongly infer that voters with certain movie or vacation
preferences are unpersuadable for their party, causing a party’s candidates not to
contact those voters.
Political parties should also be responsible for ensuring that consent was
obtained throughout the “data chain” and that all relevant parties obtained
explicit consent for any data to be used for a political purpose.169 Parties should
be ultimately responsible for ensuring that informed consent has been obtained
for all data, and should not rely on statements about consent made by third
parties such as databrokers and social media platforms.170 Political parties should
be responsible for the campaign-related activities of their associated databrokers
and for any downstream uses of voter information. Similarly, individuals may
consent only to the use of their own information, and not information about
other people. Political parties must seek consent from the voter and not piggyback
off the consent of an individual who allows access to their contacts.
Voters should not have the burden of trying to trace where all the data
has come from and whether they consented at each step. In the context of
algorithmic processes, it is difficult for voters to know what data is being used
for what purpose and what assumptions underlie the inferences being made.171
As political inferences are made from an amalgamation of data that may have
little to do explicitly with politics, voters will have difficulty detecting that their
data is being used for this purpose. Relatedly, the volume and complexity of these
data transactions makes it difficult for government regulators to monitor consent
and impose effective accountability measures on campaigns. Hence, the burden
should be on political parties to demonstrate informed consent by individual
voters for all data. Parties should be required to keep records documenting
169. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office similarly recommends that political parties
apply “due diligence when sourcing personal information from third party organizations,
including data brokers, to ensure the appropriate consent has been sought from the
individuals concerned.” ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note 3 at 5.
170. See similarly ibid, at 51 (noting that “[w]e do not believe that insertion of simple contractual
terms between [a political party] and a data broker is sufficient to mitigate the risk”).
171. Rob Kitchin describes three challenges to researching algorithms: obstacles to gaining access
to their formulation; algorithms are heterogeneous and embedded in wider systems; and
their work unfolds contextually and contingently. Rob Kitchin, “Thinking Critically About
and Researching Algorithms,” (2017) 20 Info Comm & Soc’y 14. These obstacles would
also hinder transparency and accountability with respect to campaign algorithms. They are
suggestive of the difficulties that would likely be encountered by regulators trying to monitor
algorithms and individuals trying to protect their data.
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consent for all data, and these records should be subject to audits in the same way
that records of party finances are.
7.

EXPAND OPT-OuT TO COVER ANY PERsONAL INFORMATION HELD BY
POLITICAL PARTIES

Seventh, voters should have the ability to opt out of any collection and use by
political parties of their personal information. In other contexts, as detailed in
Part II, many contacts between political parties and voters are regulated.172 Under
these existing rules, voters have some ability to control their contact with political
parties. Voters already have the right to opt out from the Register and to request
to be on a party’s internal do-not-call list. Other aspects of unsolicited contacts
by political parties are also regulated. The CRTC regulates unsolicited calls
during federal elections and has identified “[p]rotecting citizens’ right to privacy”
as an objective for these rules.173
Extrapolating from these rules, voters should be able to have greater control
over whether and how their data is collected and used by political parties.
To update the existing voter contact rules and provide similar privacy control in
the big data context, voters should be able to opt out of their information being
included in political parties’ databases. We recommend that political parties be
prohibited from collecting or using personal information about any voter who
has opted out of the Registry unless they provide explicit consent for these
other data uses.
We also recommend that the CEO should undertake educational efforts
to notify voters of their opt-out options. Currently, there is a check-off box on
individual income tax forms that people can select to opt out of the Canada
Revenue Agency sharing their information with Elections Canada to update the
Register. The CEO could additionally coordinate the process by which voters
may opt out from political parties’ databases. To increase transparency and
accountability around political parties’ data practices, the CEO should educate
voters about how political parties use their personal information, the voters’
rights with respect to their data, and their options to opt out of political party
databases. Material informing voters of their ability to opt out from the electoral
Register, as well as from political party databases, could be included on mailed
voter cards and on prominent notices at polling stations.
172. CRTC, “Rules for Unsolicited Telecommunications Made on Behalf of Political
Entities,” supra note 97.
173. CRTC, “Protecting You from Rogue and Misleading Calls During Federal Elections,”
supra note 104.
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One concern might be that, if individuals are able to pre-emptively and
generally opt-out of contact from political parties, there would be a reduction in
the number of Canadians that parties could contact to solicit their views, votes,
and financial contributions. But in practice, few voters have opted out of the
Register.174 Political parties and candidates may continue to use the list of electors
to communicate with voters who have not exercised their opt out, including for
the purposes of soliciting contributions and recruiting party members. Political
parties could continue to use non-identifiable personal information to formulate
public policy and to use personally identifiable information of voters who consent.
8.

ADDITIONAL VOTER RIGHTs PERTAINING TO BIG DATA ANALYTICs

Eighth, beyond fair information principles, voters should have additional rights
to address big data. Neither federal nor provincial privacy legislation adequately
considers the impact of big data and predictive analytics. PIPEDA has not been
amended yet to incorporate the new challenges of big data analytics, nor have
the other major privacy statutes in Canada. The European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force in 2018, updates
the EU Privacy Directive by addressing automated processing of data.175 The
GDPR confronts the challenges of big data by, inter alia, increasing transparency
obligations,176 regulating algorithmic decision making by enforcing a right to an
explanation,177 emphasizing consent,178 and placing increased responsibilities on
data controllers through the right to erasure179 and the right to de-index.180 Under
the GDPR, political opinion is part of the regulation’s definition of “sensitive

174. In a June 2019 report, Elections Canada reports that there are 26.1 million electors on the
Register, and since 1997, there have been 4200 opt outs from the Register and 160 requests
to opt out from sharing data with other jurisdictions. Elections Canada, National Register of
Electors—Updates: June 2019 Annual Lists, Report (Elections Canada, June 2019).
175. EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. See also Barbara McIsaac, Rick Shields & Kris
Klein, The Law of Privacy in Canada, Student ed (Carswell, 2004); Colin J Bennett, “Voter
Databases, Micro-targeting, and Data Protection Law: Can Political Parties Campaign in
Europe as they do in North America?” (2016) 6 Intl Data Privacy L 261 at 267.
176. GDPR, supra note 154, art 12.
177. Ibid, art 22. See also Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, “European Union Regulations on
Algorithmic Decision-Making and a ‘Right to Explanation’” (Fall 2017) AI Magazine 50.
178. GDPR, supra note 154, art 7.
179. Ibid, art 17.
180. Ibid, art 18.
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form of personal data.”181 Recital 56 of the GDPR permits political parties to
compile data on political opinion, but parties’ data practices remain subject to
the GDPR.182 The European Commission has provided guidance for various
election-related actors on GDPR’s data protection rules, which advise parties
and data analytics companies not to process personal data that was provided for
a purpose unrelated to the election and advise social media companies not to
share data with other companies without explicit consent.183 In the Parliamentary
report by Canada’s Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and
Ethics,184 the committee recommended that Canadian privacy legislation place
greater emphasis on big data problems185 and made several recommendations
that borrow from the GDPR.186
We recommend incorporating rights to increase transparency and
accountability about parties’ use of big data and analytics. Individuals should
have a right to know specifics about what information political parties hold about
them and where it was obtained. Voters should also have a right to correct the
data if it is inaccurate. More controversial among the GDPR rights would be to
grant voters a right of explanation, which would provide voters with a right to
know the reasons for algorithmic decisions made about their voting preferences

181. Ibid, art 9(1).
182. Ibid, art 9(2), Recital 56 (stating that, in the course of electoral activities, where the operation
of the democratic system requires in certain Member States that political parties compile data
on people’s political opinion, the processing of such data may be permitted for reasons of
important public interest, provided that appropriate safeguards are established). Parties must
still comply with GDPR provisions pertaining to data protection, access requests, consent,
data retention, data minimization, and deletion. See ICO, Democracy Disrupted, supra note
3 at 19 (with reference to the GDPR, “political parties are not exempt from data protection
law; they have responsibilities as data controllers to comply with all the requirements of the
law, including the data protection principles”); UK, Information Commissioner’s Office,
Guidance on Political Campaigning, vol 3.1 (ICO: 28 March 2018) (updated guidance for
parties on application of GDPR to political campaigns).
183. European Commission, “Protecting Europeans’ Personal Data in Elections” (12
September 2018), online (pdf ): <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
soteu2018-factsheet-personal-data-elections_en.pdf>.
184. ETHI, Towards Privacy by Design, supra note 5.
185. Ibid at 23.
186. For example, Recommendation 3: algorithmic transparency, Recommendation 11: right to
erasure, Recommendation 12: right to de-indexing, Recommendation 13: destruction of
personal information. Ibid at 25, 43-50.
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and persuadability, and a right to erase data.187 By comparison, PIPEDA’s fair
information principles include having accurate and complete data, and having
access to data in order to challenge its accuracy and completeness and have
it amended.188 However, there is neither a right to erase data nor a right to
explanation in PIPEDA.
On the one hand, a right to erase information could frustrate the function
of political parties in interacting with voters before and during election time.
On the other hand, voter autonomy and informed consent would support
voters being able have their data removed if they no longer want to be included,
or never consented to being included, in a party’s database. A right to erase would
be consistent with other options Canadian voters have, including opt-outs for
the national Register and requesting to be placed on a party’s internal do-not-call
list. A right to erase could be seen as effectuating and updating these existing
voter rights by providing similar mechanisms for voters to exercise their data
preferences in the context of big data.
We endorse a compromise position that parties would be obliged to destroy
some data at the request of the voter, such as that obtained through big data
inferences, while being permitted to keep the basic data to which they are entitled
from the Register (provided the voter did not opt out) or to retain some other
minimally intrusive subset of data. Parties should also be permitted to retain
data that was volunteered by voters through direct interactions with parties or
candidates, such as during canvassing. Claims from parties that they are entitled
to keep basic information needed to communicate with the electorate and
information that they have obtained through direct voter interactions are more
compelling than claims that political parties are entitled to keep data that has been
acquired from a commercial entity, data that includes non-political information,
or psychological inferences drawn from such data, when the individual wants
it to be destroyed. We also support a limited data retention period of ten years,
as described below in Part III.D.10.
Finally, at this time we do not recommend that voters have a right to know
what political decisions political parties have made about them on the basis of
big data. We believe that a right to explanation would impinge on campaign
187. See GDPR, supra note 154, art 15, art 17, and Recital 71. The GDPR’s most explicit
description of the right of explanation is in Recital 71, which is non-binding. Recital 71
provides that decisions based solely on automated processing and producing a legal effect
that significantly affect a data subject should have suitable safeguards, including specific
information to the data subject and the right to human intervention to obtain an explanation
of the decision and to challenge it.
188. PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule 1, ss 4.6, 4.9, Principles 6 and 9.
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strategies and party policies. We therefore do not recommend a GDPR-style right
to an explanation, but it is an option that is likely to be considered.
9.

DATA SHARING

Ninth, in addition to political parties being barred from using data for
non-political purposes, which would preclude parties from selling information
to commercial actors, political parties should be regulated in how they share voter
information. We recommend three rules for data sharing with third parties, data
sharing with other parties, and data sharing within a party.
i

Political parties should be prevented from sharing voter information with third
parties. Third parties are broadly defined in section 349 of the CEA to include
any entities or individuals other than political parties, candidates, leadership
contestants, nomination contestants, and electoral district associations. Political
advertising by third parties is heavily regulated by the CEA. Third parties are
required to register spending over $500 on political advertising, to disclose
information on their structure and activities to Elections Canada, and to abide by
a spending limit for advertising during the election period.189 Political parties and
third parties are distinct legal entities and must operate at arm’s length.190 Political
parties are legally barred from colluding in a variety of ways with third parties.191
The collusion rules in the Elections Act, which are designed to prevent attempts
to evade the rules on political advertising, impose mandatory registration of
third parties, require disclosure about the entity purchasing the advertising, and
establish financial spending limits for both political parties and third parties.192
The same type of collusion rules that apply to political advertising should
apply to data. Collusion between political parties and third parties on voter
data is as troubling as collusion between political parties and third parties on
advertising. Any type of collusion between the entities harms electoral integrity.

189. CEA, supra note 8, s 353(1).
190. See CEA, supra note 8, s. 349, where the definition of “third party” excludes registered
political parties and their candidates and electoral district associations.
191. See Michael Pal, “Third Party Political Participation and Anti-Collusion Rules” (2018) 61
Can Pub Admin 284.
192. See Elections Canada, “Interacting with Third Parties in the Pre-election and Election
Periods” in Political Financing Handbook for Registered Parties and Chief Agents
(April 2020), ch 11.
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Collusion between political parties and third parties around voter data has the
added dimension of potentially harming voter privacy.
Such rules prohibiting data collusion would limit the flow of information
between political parties and third parties. There would be minimal—if any—
harms resulting from such reforms. Any significant exchange of information
that leads to coordination around advertising, for example, is already barred,
since they are distinct legal entities that must operate at arm’s length. The same
reasoning applies to collusion about data that emerges from, for example,
sharing information about voters. Permitting data collusion would undermine
the effectiveness of the existing anti-collusion provisions in the CEA, which are
focused on preventing avoidance of spending and contribution limits.
ii

Data sharing between political parties in Canada is less problematic than sharing
with third parties and should be permitted, provided there is informed consent by
the voter. Data sharing between different Canadian political parties would arise if
federal political parties want to formally divulge their voter information with their
official provincial affiliates or the candidates for leadership of the party. Federal
political parties might also wish to share the data informally with technically
unaffiliated (but, in practice, politically allied) provincial parties, or even
municipal candidates. In contrast to data transfers involving political parties and
commercial entities, the data transfers between Canadian political parties involve
entities that all have political purposes. In contrast to data sharing between
political parties and third parties, the data sharing between Canadian political
parties involves entities that operate in different election jurisdictions, which
eliminates the concern about collusion that attaches to sharing with third parties.
Given these differences, a key issue that remains is voter consent for these
downstream uses of voter data. To satisfy informed consent, the privacy rules
applying to the data held by these other political parties should be clearly
described. Voters should be able to get information when requested about data
sharing and the privacy protections in place to protect their data in the hands
of the transferee. It is possible that local or provincial rules are so diverse that
there will be unsatisfactory privacy protection for the shared data when it reaches
new hands. One option is that a party could share data with a second party
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in another jurisdiction only where that jurisdiction has “substantially similar”
privacy protections to those that would be operating at the federal level.193
iii

Information sharing within parties should largely be facilitated, provided that
voter data is treated confidentially and appropriate security measures are taken,
as discussed in Part III.D.10. As long as it is necessary for political activities,
sharing information between the central party and its candidate in a riding or
the electoral district association (EDA) should be permitted if reasonably related
to the purposes for which a voter originally consented. Preventing the flow of
information between affiliated entities would fly in the face of how parties operate,
which is increasingly as centralised organizations.194 Such information may be
particularly useful for campaigning or fundraising. Although under the CEA
political parties are separate legal entities from candidates, leadership contestants,
and EDAs, the CEA nonetheless envisions a close relationship between them and
already facilitates it in multiple ways, such as permitting the transfer of money or
non-monetary resources. Data should be treated the same way as other resources
that the CEA already allows to be transferred, provided that there is a legitimate
political purpose for the internal sharing of data. Parties should be required
to have internal controls to make sure that only those authorised to view the
data may do so.
10. CYBERsECuRITY PROTOCOLs

Tenth, political parties should be required to implement cybersecurity protocols
to protect the storage and transmission of voter data by political parties. The
193. A similar condition is in place with PIPEDA, where the federal legislation applies unless
there is “substantially similar” provincial legislation. See PIPEDA, supra note 7, s 26(2)(b).
This section provides that the Governor in Council can exempt organizations or activities
from PIPEDA’s application if the province has passed substantially similar legislation. British
Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta have their own provincial private-sector privacy legislation.
See Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5; Personal Information Protection Act,
SBC 2003, c 63; Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector,
CQLR c P-39.1. Additionally, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland
have their own health privacy legislation. See Personal Health Information Protection Act,
2004, SO 2004, c 3, sched A; Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, SNB 2009,
c P-7.05; Protection of Personal Health Information, SNL 2008, c P-7.01; Personal Health
Information Act, SNS 2010, c 41.
194. See William Cross & Lisa Young, “Candidate Recruitment in Canada” in Amanda Bittner &
Royce Koop, eds, Parties, Elections, and the Future of Canadian Politics (UBC Press, 2013) 24
at 25-26. For example, there is central party involvement even in local candidate selection.
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unauthorised release of voter data would have privacy and national security
implications. The unauthorised release of voters’ personal information can lead to
identity theft, foreign surveillance, and foreign interference in elections. Political
parties are data-rich targets for foreign actors, as evidenced by the hacking of
the Democratic National Committee in the 2016 US presidential election.195
The Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSE)196 and Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)197 have both identified Canadian political
parties as likely targets for foreign interference. The CEO in 2013 recommended
amendments to the CEA “to require that political parties demonstrate due
diligence when giving access to their voter databases.”198 The CEO highlighted the
“privacy risks associated with these databases,” where political parties “not only
handle large amounts of personal information, but also share this information
with a small army of volunteers and local campaign workers.”199 The parties’
internal management practices matter for how much trust individuals will feel
toward parties with regard to their data and are important for electoral integrity.
Parties should be required to adhere to established security protocols for
data retention, encryption, and data breach notification. For data retention,
we recommend that the maximum amount of time that voter data may be retained
should be limited to ten years. A ten-year rule would cover at least two federal
elections given the requirement, in section 4(1) of the Charter, that elections must
be held at least every five years.200 By comparison, PIPEDA’s fair information
principles limit the data retention period to only as long as necessary to fulfill

195. The special counsel investigation by Robert Mueller indicted 13 Russian nationals and 3
Russian entities accused of interfering with US elections and political processes. United
States v Internet Research Agency, et al, (16 February 2018) DC Cir, Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(Grand Jury Indictment).
196. CSE, Cyber Threats, supra note 112; CSE, 2019 Update, supra note 112. See generally
Elizabeth F Judge & Michael Pal, “Election Cyber Security Challenges for Canada” (2019),
online: Centre for International Governance Innovation <www.cigionline.org/articles/
election-cyber-security-challenges-canada>.
197. See Alex Boutilier, “‘Total’ Information Warfare a Threat to Democracy: CSIS Report” (22
February 2018), online: The Toronto Star <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/02/22/
csis-says-total-information-warfare-a-threat-to-democracy.html>.
198. CEO, “Preventing Deceptive Communications,” supra note 137 at 32.
199. Ibid at 20.
200. Charter, supra note 151, s 4(1).
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the collection purpose.201 Applying PIPEDA’s purpose guideline could lead to
extensive and indefinite retention periods of voter data since “political” purpose
could be broadly construed. Shorter retention periods can lessen the impact of a
data breach by decreasing the volume of stored data and can reduce the chance of
inaccurate outdated data being stored. With the low price of data storage, parties
have little economic incentive to delete data on their own initiative.202 For voters
to have predictability about data retention, a fixed term of ten years is preferable.
Parties should be required to implement internal security measures to protect
voter data (including inferences) such as strong encryption, limiting the number
of people who can access the parties’ databases, and prohibitions on accessing or
storing voter data through unsecured mobile devices or networks. Political parties
should be required to notify the CEO of any data breach involving voter data.
Political parties should also limit the use of smart devices, such as home assistant
devices and other “always-on” devices such as smart speakers, which could record
discussions about voter information, resulting in unsecured access. Cloud storage
and servers outside of Canada also pose security risks.
11. ENFORCEMENT

Finally, the authority for regulatory oversight of political parties’ practices
regarding voter privacy should be specifically delineated in the resulting legislation
and the available mechanisms for enforcement. PIPEDA has been plagued by
weak enforcement measures. Under PIPEDA, the OPC lacks important powers
such as the ability to levy fines and make orders, and individuals can file an action
in court only after they file a complaint with the OPC and wait for the Privacy
Commissioner’s findings to be issued. Under the EMA, there are provisions
relevant to voter privacy, but their enforcement similarly lacks teeth. The EMA
requires some reporting in parties’ privacy policies about voter data, but it is
hard to assess what measures suffice since there are no substantive standards.
Further, the enforcement remedy is deregistering, which is a blunt instrument
that is unlikely to be applied to a political party.
201. PIPEDA, supra note 7, Schedule 1, s 4.5, Principle 5. See also Élections Québec, Partis
politiques et protection des renseignements personnels: Exposé de la situation québécoise,
perspectives comparées et recommandations, (Report) (Élections Québec, 2019) at
90 (recommending that parties destroy personal information when the use is no
longer necessary).
202. See McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 31. The BC Information and Privacy
Commissioner, in his study of BC political parties, found “all the political parties had an
undefined or indefinite retention period for personal information, including information that
was incorrect or out of date.”
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To avoid repeating those enforcement errors, voter privacy legislation should
include strong oversight, compliance, and enforcement measures (including
audits, inspections, fines, and order making), and it should give individuals a
right to bring a cause of action against a political party or campaign directly for
privacy infringements.

IV. CONCLUSION
The move toward “big data” politics has serious implications not only for the
privacy of Canadian voters but also for the health of democracy and the integrity
of elections. As the BC Information and Privacy Commissioner observed,
robust communication with the electorate is…in the public interest, in the interest
of democracy, and not just the political self-interest of the parties. However…this
communication should be a fully transparent two-way street. A one sided dialogue
in which the public is kept largely in the dark about the significant amounts of
personal information collected and used about them is not sustainable legally or
ethically.203

Nevertheless, the one-way street persists. The current state of legislation in Canada
largely exempts political parties from regulation on the collection and use of
voters’ information, apart from minor obligations in the 2018 amendments to
the CEA that political parties have a privacy policy. Although there is no certainty
that campaigns are running successful or accurate big data practices, concerns
over the use—and potential misuse—of voters’ personal information arise
regardless of the accuracy of the inferences made, given the granularity of voter
data in political campaigns, the mass collection of such data, and the manner
in which such data is now being used. These big-data practices exacerbate the
longstanding problem that political parties have not been regulated by privacy
legislation and neither election laws nor other legislation has imposed privacy
obligations on parties. So far, Canadian law has not adequately addressed the
admittedly complicated interplay of privacy and democratic concerns around
voter information in the elections context.204
203. McEvoy, Full Disclosure, supra note 5 at 43.
204. After this article was published, the federal government introduced large-scale amendments
to PIPEDA in Bill C-11. See Bill C-11, An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act
and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and to make consequential
and related amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl (first reading 17 November 2020),
online: <parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-11/first-reading>. However, Bill C-11
does not address the absence of meaningful privacy regulation for political parties as political
parties are not subject to the proposed changes to the privacy framework.
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Political practices have evolved rapidly over the course of several elections
with reliance on big data and microtargeting, and the lack of strong privacy
regulation has become more glaring. Data-driven campaigning is here, and
here to stay, if we are to judge by the predominance of data-dependent
campaigns, the perceived success of data-driven candidates, and the laments by
less-than-successful candidates that their fortunes would have been different had
there been more and better data about voters. Campaigns, if not voters, seem to
be true believers in the value of data. The issues with voter privacy that we have
identified in this article are likely to only grow in significance in Canadian politics
as new techniques of data analysis relying on more invasive and larger quantities
of personal information and new technologies for the more precise analysis of
that data emerge, underscoring the need to find solutions to address the gaps in
the regulatory framework. It makes little sense that political parties be permitted
to operate outside of generally accepted principles of privacy law and best
practices for protecting personal information. Political information about voters’
beliefs and preferences should be accorded the same protection as the personal
information that is held by the private and public sectors about Canadians. Legal
reform to protect voter privacy should be done in a manner that respects the
personal information of voters and the democratic connection between parties
and voters. Toward this end, we have provided eleven guidelines for the design of
legislation to protect voter privacy in the age of big-data elections.

